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The troublesome debts of many developing  *  Incentives to repay. Maintaining access to
countries have spawned much literature on why  credit markets can by itself be a reason to repay
countries borrow, on what debt contributes to  enot.  h to sustain substantial debt levels.
growth, on why countries repay, and on how to
deal with existing debt. Eaton provides an  *  Options available to a creditor whose debtor
analytical primer on the following aspects of  is unwilling to meet current debt-service obliga-
sovereign debt:  tions.
- The basic accounting concepts associated  e  Debt buybacks. Eaton concludes that in the
with debt and some data, particularly about the  absence of any efficiency cost imposed by
net resource transfers associated with extemal  outstanding debt (so that the only implications of
borrowing.  the formn  and extent of repayment are for the
distribution of surplus between borrower and
The mechanics of debt and growth im"'lcd  lender), how much a buyback benefits the
in the Harrod-Domar and two-gap growth  borrower depends on how much buying back
models. Eaton points out how this analysis can  debt reduces what is available for repayment
yield misleading conclusions about the sustain-  later.
ability of debt and the determinants of solvency.
Eaton also concludes that if there are effi-
* Debt as a component of an optimizing  ciency losses associated with debt (a "debt
mod A of borrowing in a competitive loan  overhang"), debt forgiveness can benefit both a
market, when the borrower faces an  debtor nation and its creditors. Contrary to
intertemporal budget constraint.  claims in the literature, this outcome does not
require that a reduction in the face value of debt
* Debt as a component of recent models of  raise its market value (a "debt Laffer curve"),
endogenous growth. Eaton concludes that what  and the debtor benefits even though the buyback
debt contributes to growth depends greatly on  raises the market price of the debt. The effi-
the source of growth.  ciency argument for buybacks is inconsistent
with the case for lengthening the debt's maturity.
* Problems  arising  from sovereign  risk,
including problems of liquidity, enforcement,
and revenue-raising to finance repayment (and
the attendant problem of capital flight).
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1.  Introduction
The  recent  debt  problems  of a  number  of developing  countries,  and  the
potential  demand  for  foreign  capital  by formerly  socialist  countries,  raises  a
number  of basic  questions  about  the  role  of sovereign  debt in  e-onomic
development  and  growth. My purpose  here is to  provide  a  basic,  albeit
analytic,  introduction  to some  issues  raised  by foreign  borrowing,  especially
foreign  borrowing  by sovereign  governments  from  private  creditors.
The  paper  is  not meant  to be a survey  of the  literature.  A number  of
issues  are ignored,  and  I  have not  attempted  to provide  a complete  set  of
references  to the  literature.' Indeed,  a  number  of important  contribuzions
are  unmentioned. Rather,  I  have tried  to identify  areas:  (i)  where  recent
analytic  developments  may  provide  useful  tools,  or at least  food for  thought,
for  the  applied  economist; (ii)  that  are likely  to  present  pitfalls; or
(iii)  where the  existing  literature  seems  to  have generated  confusion. I  have
then  attempted  to provide  rudimentary  frameworks: (i)  for  applying  existing
analytic  tools  to applied  problems; (ii)  to show  where  traditional  analysis
can leae  one  astray;  (iii)  to clarify  what I find  to be misleading  or
confusing  points  in the  existing  literature.
Section  2 presents  some  basic  accounting  distinctions,  and  discusses  data
on the  debt to  private  creditors  of a number  of large  sovereign  debtors.
II  refer  readers  to Glick  and  Kharas  (1984),  Eaton,  Gersovitz,  and
Stiglitz  (1987),  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1987)  and  Eaton  (1989a)  for  treatments  of a
wider  range  of issues  and  more comprehensive  bibliographies.-2-
Sections  3 and 5  concern  the  contribution  of debt  to growth. Section  3
revie-s  traditional  nonoptimizing  or "knife-edge"  models  of borrowing,  such  as
the  Harrod-Domar  and  the  two-gap  models. Here I discuss  such  notions  as
"debt-traps"  and "ionzi  schemes.' In Section  4 I turn  to intertemporal
optimization,  introducing  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  and the
"transverselity  condition"  on  borrowing. A particular  purpose  is to  point  out
where  knife-edged  analysis  can  mislead. Section  5 then  considers  borrowing  in
a recent  class  of optimizing  growth  models  in  which  the  rate  of growth  is
endogenous. While  the  focus,  as in  the  nonoptimizing  literature,  is on the
relationship  between  debt  and  growth,  the  methodology  is  quite  different. I
consider  two  particular  contributions  to this  literature,  one  by Lucas  (1988)
and  one  by Cohen  (1991)  and  point  out  how different  assumptions  about  the
source  of growth  have  very different  implications  for  the  role  of foreign
borrowing  in  economic  development.
Sections  3 through  5 consider  debt in a  world  in  which  debt  contracts
with sovereign  debtors  are  automatically  and  costlessly  honored. Hence,  as
long  as a  nation  has the  resources  to  pay its  creditors  what it  owes,  it does
so.  The remain'  sections  consider  problems  that  arise  from  a sovereign
government's  potential  inability  to  appropriate  domestic  resources  to service
debt,  or its  unwillingness  to service  debt.  Section  6 discusses  four
particular  issues: (i)  the  excess  burden  associated  with taxing  domestic
resources  to repay  debt (the  "public  finance"  problem),  (ii)  the "liquidity"
problem,  (iii)  the "enforcement"  problem,  and  the "information"  problem.
Section  7  considers  the incentives  a sovereign  debtor  has to service  its  debt,
and  what these  incentives  imply  about  how  much debt  it can  sustain. A
particular  issue  is  whether  a  nation's  desire  to maintain  a "reputation  for
creditworthiness"  alone  can  provide  an incentive  to service  debt,  a point-3  -
about  which  a great  deal  of confusion  was  recently  introduced.  In section  8 I
review  the  options  facing  creditors  whose  sovereign  debtors  are  not  paying
what they  owe.  Here I discuss  debt  relief,  the  role  of official  lenders,  and
the  notions  of a "debt  overhang"  and the  "debt  Laffer  curve.' In Section  9  I
turn  to "market-based"  debt  reduction  schemes,  such  as  various  swap
arrangements  and  debt  buybacks. Section  10  concludes  with a  brief  review  of
other  issues.-4-
2.  Some Basic Concepts and Magnitudes
Some simple distinctions among the  various stocks and flows associated
with debt should be made.  Starting with stocks, one distinction is between
disbursed and undisbursed debt, the second consisting of commitments made by
lenders that have not been drawn upon, and therefore are not yet accumulating
interest.  Part of disbursed debt is interest arrears, accumulated unpaid
interest obligations.  Henceforth, by "debt" (or  D  t) I mean "disbursed debt."
Turning to flows, debt service payments in period t (DS  t) consist of
interest payments (IPt) and principal repayments (PRt)  associated with
disbursed debt.  Thus DSt =  IPt +  PR . The net flow in period t (Bt) is new
borrowing (loan disbursements plus accumulation of arrears' in period t (NB  t)
less repayments of principal, i.e., Bt - NBt  -PRt.  This is the amount by
which the nominal stock of disbursed debt changes in period t.  Hence
(denoting the change in variable x as x), Bt - Dt.
Finally, the net transfer in period t (NT  t) equals the net flow less
interest payments or, 3quivalently, new borrowing less debt service, i.e.,
NTt =  Bt  - IPt  = NB  - DS . This concept is especially critical in that it Nt  =  t  - t =  t  t'
represents the net flow of real resources from creditors to the debtor.  A
positive value means that creditors are contributing resources to the debtor
country while a negative value means that creditors are taking resources away.
A hypothetical observer privy to a nation's complete set of international
transactions concerning goods and services (other than interest payments) and
its foreign aid receipts could ascertain the net resource transfer even if it
could not observe any balance sheets or financial transactions.
The appendix presents annual data on disbursements, principal and-5-
interest  payments  and  the  consequent  net resource  transfers  between  twenty-six
higtily-indebted  countries  and their  private  creditors  during  1970-1988.
Values  are  in current  U.S.  dollars. A negative  number  (in  parentheses)
indicates  a  net resource  transfer  to the  creditor.
For  each  country,  the  botton  row  gives  the 1969  present  value  of the  net
transfer,  where  the  3-month  U.S. Treasury  Bill  rate  serves  as discount  factor.
For  each  country,  the  upper  figure  in  the  final  column  is the  number  of times
the  net  resource  transfer  changed  sign  during  the  nineteen  year  period. The
lower  figure  is the  1969  present  value  of the  cumulative  net resource  transfer
as of tbe  end  of 1988.
Two  observations  are  worth  making. One, to  be taken  up later,  is that
net resource  transfers  change  signs  quite  often,  on  average  every  three  or
four  years.  Second,  as of the  end  of 1988,  only three  of the  twenty-six
countries  had  made net  resource  transfers  to  creditors  over  the  entire  period:
Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  and  Yugosiavia. For  the  rest,  the  relationship  between
private  creditors  and  debtors  has  meant  a significant  real  net transfer  from
private  creditors  (as  a group)  to the  borrower.-6-
3.  Debt  and  Growth: "Knife-Edged"  Analysis
How does  debt relate  to the  growth  of the  debtor? Early  on,  economists
put the  Harrod-Domar  growth  model,  due  to  Harrod  (1939)  and  Domar  (1946),  to
work to answer  this  question. This framework  describes  an economy  very simply
with four  parameters: (1)  the  capital-output  ratio,  1/a,  (2)  the  savings
ratio  out  of income,  s,  (3)  the  rate  of growth  of the  effective  labor  force,
n, and (4,  the  rate of depreciation  of the  capital  stock  6.  These  variables
are  assumed  exogenous  and constant  over time.
For  a closed  economy,  the  growth  rate "warranted"  by savings  and
w technology,  g ,  is given  by:
w  - sa - 6  (3.1)
This relationship  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  change  in the  capital
stock  AK is given  by investment,  which  equals  savings  or sQ,  where  Q is  output
less  depreciation  6K.  Dividing  both side  by K gives  the  result. Since  Q is
proportional  to K, Q and  K grow  at the  same  rate. An obvious  problem  is that
g  may not  equal  the  natural  growth  rate  n, the "knife-edge"  problem.
Rosenstein-Rodan  (1961),  for  example,  used this  formulation  to calculate
"aid  requirements,"  meaning  the  amount  of foreign  aid  needed  to  bring  the
warranted  growth  rate  into  line  with the  natural  rate.  Assuming  that  a
constant  share  s' of foreign  aid  is saved,  and  treating  aid  as a fraction  a of
output,  the  warranted  rate  adjusted  for  aid  becomes:
w g  (s  +  s'a)a  - 6,  (3.2)-Z/-
so required  aid  as a share  of output  1.s  a* - (n  + 6 - sa)/Qs'. 2
3.1  The  Mechanics  of  Debt  Dynamics
The  model  can  also  be applied  to foreign  debt.  Denote  net foreign  debt
at any  time  t as DL and  the  ratio  of debt  to outplt  as dt.  If r is the
interest  rate (assumed  constant)  then  period  interest  payment  obligations
are  rDt,  while  net  borrowing  is Dt.  The  net  transfer  is  Dt - rDt.
The issue  of identifying  the  appropriate  income  concept  for  savings  now
arises. To be quite  general,  let  s denote  the  savings  rate  out  of output,  s'
the  dissavings  rate  out  of interest  payments,  and s" the  savings  rate  out  of
net  borrowing. Thus:
K - saKt-  s'rDt  + s"Dt -6K.  (3.3)
Since  Dt/Kt  - ad  + adtKt/Kt,  where  dt  /  Dt/Yt,  the  ratio  of debt  to output:
K
g- _ _t - [(s  - s'rd  + s"d )a - 6]/(l  - s"ad  ).  (3.4)
K  t  t  t
t
The rate  of change  of the  ratio  of debt  to output  is therefore:
d  _ g - g  + (s'r  - s"g)da
2In  Eaton (1989a)  I  provide  more complete  references  on applications  of
Harrod-Domar  analysis  to aid  and  debt  problem-.-8-
(with  time  subscripts  omitted).
If the  debt-output  ratio  is  maintained  at some  constant  level  d then  the
d warranted  growth  rate  allowing  for  debt,  g ,  is:
gd  _ (w-  s'rda6)/(l  - s"da).  (3.6)
The long-run  effect  of of a  lpermanent  change  in the  rat4n  of debt  to
output  on growth  can  be obtained  by differentiating  this  expression  with
respect  to d.  The  result  is  that  higher  debt  raises  growth  if and  only if
s"(sa-6)  >  s'r.  If,  say,  the  dissavings  rate  out  of interest  payments  equals
the  savings  rate  out  of  nev  borrowing  (s'  - s')  then  higher  debt  raises  the
growth  rate if  and  only if the  warranted  growth  rate  for  the.-closed  economy
exceeds  the interest  rate.
A
Similarly,  if  a particular  growth  rate  g (such  as the  natural  rate)  is to
be sustained  with a constant  ratio  of debt  to output,  then  the  debt-output
ratio  must attain  a level:
A  A
w
d  _______  _  g -g  (3.7)
(s'r-s"g)a  (s'r-s"g)a
If s'  - s"  .ien  the  sign  of this  expression  depends  upon the  relationship
A
between  the  target  growth  rate  g, the  warranted  growth  rate  gw and  the
interest  rate.  Positive  debt is  called  for  either  when the  warranted  rate  and
interest  rate  both exceed  the  target  rate  or  both are  exceeded  by the  target
rate.-9-
3.2  Stability  and  the "Debt  Trap"
Stability  requires  that  d  be negative  when d is  just  above  d and  positive




add  s"l I
which  must  be  negative  for  stability. Hence,  if s' - s",  stability  requires
that the  actual  growth  rate  exceed  the interest  rate.
If this  condition  is  not satisfied  then  an increase  in debt  above  d
raises  interest  obligations  more than it  raises  the  additional  borrowing  that
can  occur  to  maintain  a steady  d.  Ever-increasing  amounta  of debt  relative  to
output  are  thus  needed  to finance  debt service  payments. A nredicament  of
this  sort is sometimes  called  a "debt  trap."
3.3  Steady-State  Debt  and  Ponzi  Schemes
If the  stability  condition  is satisfied  then,  from (3.7),  the
steady-state  debt-output  ratio  is  positive  or negative  depending  upon  whether
the  desired  growth  rate  exceeds  or is  exceeded  by the  warranted  rate.  For  the
economy  to  grow faster  than  what is  warranted  by domestic  saving  requires
positive  debt.  Since  the  stability  condition  is satisfied,  new  borrowing  is
always  sufficient  to repay  interest  on old  debt  and  finance  additional
investment  without  raising  the  ratio  of debt to  output.
This  analysis  has led  to the  conclusion  that  a debtor  country  is
"solvent"  or "creditworthy"  if it grows  at a faster  rate  than  the  interest-10-
rate,  as countries  occasionally  do and  as  many of the  current  highly-indebted
countries  did  during  the  1970s.
There  are  several  reasons,  however,  why this  criterion  is a  misleading
indicator  of a country's  creditworthLness.
First,  it is  unlikely  that  the  underlying  parameters  of the  analysis,
such  as the  capital-output  and  savings  ratios,  will remain  constant  over  the
long  term.
A second,  related,  reasor.  is  that  the  stock  of net  debt itself  should
have implications  for  a country's  savings  behavior. The  assumption  that
savings  depends  on income  flows  implies  that,  other  things  equal,  as a country
becomes  more indebted  it saves  less (since  its  interest  obligations  rise).
But it  might  seem  reasonable  to assume  that  as a country  becomes  more
indebted,  anticipated  future  debt-service  obligations  would  raise  savings.
Third,  and  most important,  if a country's  output  perpetually  grew faster
than  the interest  rate  and it  maintained  a constant  debt-output  ratio,  then
net  borrowing  would  perpetually  exceed  interest  payments,  meaning  that  the  net
t'  ansfer  associated  with debt  would  forever  be positive. This is inconsistent
with rational  behavior  on the  part of lenders. It the  stock  of debt could
forever  grow faster  than  the  interest  rate  then  any  debtor  could  successfully
set  up a "Ponzi"  scheme,  using  new  borrowing  to  pay off  old  debt.  Demand  for
debt  to finance  such schemes  would  eventually  drive  the  world  interest  rate to
at least  the  growth  rate  of loanable  funds.
The second  objection  can  be overcome  by introducing  an explicit  direct
feedbcc',  from  the  stock  of debt  to domestic  savings. Say that  for  each
additional  unit of debt,  domestic  savings  increases  by a.  With this
modification,  accumulation  of debt  per  unit of output  becomes:-11 -
A
d - (g  V)/a  + (s'r-s"g-a)d
SH  (3.6)
Stability  is now  guaranteed  by the  condition  that  s'r  - s"g - a < 0.  The
steady-state  ratio  of debt to  output  associated  with a growth  rate  g is then:
A
-d  _  (g -g)/a  (3.7)
s'r-s"g-a
Note that,  as  before,  the  condition  for  stability  implies  that  a country
become  a de,tor  to maintain  a growth  rate  permanently  in excess  of the  rate
warranted  by domestic  resources. Even if s' = s",  however,  it  need not  be the
case  that  creditors  make perpetual  net transfers  to the  country  to raise  its
growth  rate.  Going  into  debt  can  raise  a country's  growth  rate  even  when the
country  is  making  net  transfers  to  creditors. Indebtedness  raises  the  growth
rate  by raising  domestic  savings.
3.4  Two-Gap  Models
The  Harrod-Domar  model,  and  the  analysis  of debt  dynamics  that  follows
from it,  assume  a single,  homogeneous  output  that  can  also serve  as the
capital  stock. The amount  of output  allocated  toward  investment,  and the
incremental  capital-output  ratio  thus  limit  the  growth  rate.
The two-gap  model  posits  that  output  requires  not only  physical  capital
that  can  be produced  domestically,  but an imported  input  (that  could  also  be a
capital  good)  that is  not  produced  domestically.  Both  domestic  capital  and
the  imported  input  are  essential  for  production,  and  the  standard  assumption
is that  they  are  needed  in fixed  proportions. If  Kd denotes  the  stock  of-12-
domestic  capital  and  Kf the  stock  of the imported  input  then  output  Q is given
by:
Q - min[aKcd,oPKfI
where  P  is some  positive  parameter.
If  domestic  savings  is a  proportion  s of income  Y, in the  absence  of
foreign  aid, lending,  or depreciation  (6-0)  the  growth  rate "warranted"  by
domestic  savings  is  now s/K  where  # - l/a  +  1/fi.
For  the  economy  to grow  at this  rate,  however,  requires  an investment  of
foreign  capital  If  equal  to a share  s/pK  of output  each  period. Obtaining
this  foreign  capital  with domestic  savings  does  not  pose an additional  problem
if it  can  be purchased  at a given  price  with domestic  output. The  analysis
assumes,  however,  that  this  is  not the  case,  but rather  that  the  supply  of
foreign  capital  has an upper  bound  proportional  to capacity.  If f  denotes  the
availability  of foreign  capital  relative  to  capacity  then  the  warranted  growth
rate  can  be sustained  as long  as eo  >  s/K. Otherwise,  the  availability  of
foreign  capital,  rather  than  domestic  savings,  limits  growth,  and  the  maximum
sustainable  growth  rate  is cfi.  In  this  case increases  in the  domestic  savings
rate  do not increase  growth.
Th's framework  has  been called  the "two-gap"  model  because  there  are  now
two  possible  resource  gaps  that  keep  the  actual  growth  rate  below  the  growth
rate  of the  labor  force,  or the "natural"  growth  rate.  One is the  gap  in
domestic  savings. The other  is the  gap  in foreign  exchange.
Say  that  foreign  exchange  is indeed  the  binding  gap,  so that in the
absence  of foreign  debt growth  is constrained  to  Pe.  Foreign  borrowing
obviously  provides  an additional  source  of foreign  exchange,  but servicing-13-
debt  is an additional  use.  Again,  denoting  total  foreign  debt in  period  t  by
Dt and  the  ratio  of debt to  output  as dt,  the  growth  rate "warrant.;J"  by the
f availability  of foreign  capital,  g ,  becomes:
f  (Ce+  t-  rd  t)
9t
1 -fdt
If in  the long-run  a constant  ratio  of debt  to output  is  maintained,  so
f that  dt  - 0 and  dt  - d, then  the  warranted  growth  rate  g  is given  by:
f  -(e-  rd)
1-fi
The  basic  implications  are  qualitatively  similar  to those  of the
Harrod-Domar  analysis:
First,  the  long  run effect  of an increase  in d on gr is  positive  or
negative  as fe  exceeds  or is exceeded  by r.  As in the  basic  Harrod-Domar
model,  if the  growth  rate in the  absence  of  borrowing  exceeds  the interest
rate  then  net  borrowing  has the  long-run  effect  of increasing  growth  even
further  while,  if in the  absence  of borrowing  the  warranted  growth  rate is
lower  than  the  interest  rate,  net  borrowing  lowers  the  warranted  growth  rate.
Say  that the  economy  tries  to use  borrowing  to acbieve  a target  growth
rate  g.  The long-run  level  of debt  necessary  to do this  is given  by:
A  f  A
d s wpt  g  - p
P(r-g)  P(r-g)
Again, as with the Harrod-Domar model, a positive level of debt is implied-14-
only  when the  target  rate is  either  below  the  warranted  rate  and the  interest
rate  or above  these  two  rates.
Finally,  for  any  given  growth  rate  g, the  change  in the  debt-output  ratio
is  given  by:
f
d - +  (r-g)d,
Again,  stability  requires  a growth  rate in  excess  of the  interest  rate.
As in the  simpler  Harrod-Domar  model,  the  stability  condition  implies  that  a
positive  permanent  level  of debt is  associated  with growth  above  the  warranted
rate.
3.5  Implications  of the "Knife-Edge"  Models
The  Harrod-Domar  and  two-gap  models  have  been  popular  tools  for  analyzing
the  debt  problems  of developing  countries. For  one thing,  they  allow  the
analyst  to  make long-term  projections  with  a minimal  amount  of data.
Nevertheless,  there  are  at least  two  reasons  why they  can  yield  very
misleading  results:
First,  there  is little  reason  to think  that  the  magnitudes  they  treat  as
constants  should  be.  Opportunities  for  substitution  between  capital  and other
factors  imply  that  the  capital-output  ratio  should  rise  with nore investment.
In fact,  capital-output  ratios  can  fluctuate  wildly.  Similarly,  the  savings
rate  should  depend  on more than  current  income  and the  stock  of debt.  A
framework  should  base its  assumptions  about  how investment  affects  output  and
about  savings  on a  more complete  description  of technology  and  the
intertemporal  trade-offs  facing  the  economy.-15-
Second,  and  more  fundamentally,  the  analysis  makes  unreasonable
assumptions  about  the  resources  that  a competitive  world  loan  market  can  be
expected  to  provide  a borrowing  country. Stability  in  these  models  requires  a
growth  rate  in excess  of the  world  interest  rate.  But  if the  country
maintains  a constant  debt-output  ratio  then  its  debt  must also  grow  faster
than the  interest  rate.  Creditors  must  always  lend  the  country  more than  what
it owes to  service  past debt  so that  it  never  needs  to  make  net resource
transfers  to its  creditors. Moreover,  the faster  it grows,  the  more resources
it can  perpetually  obtain  from  the  rest  of the  world. This state  of affairs
is  unsustainable,  however. In  order  for the  country  not, at some  point,  to
exhaust  the  world supply  of funds,  world  wealth  must  also grow  forever  at
least  as fast  as the  country. But  then  anyone  could  always  borrow  whatever
was  needed  to repay  past debts. Attempts  to do so  would  drive  the  world
interest  rate  up to at least  the  growth  rate  of  world  wealth,  however. While
we have  observed  growth  rates  far  in excess  of interest  rates,  the  phenomenon
has  necessarily  been a temporary  one. The  next section  discusses  how the
constraints  that  world  capital  markets  impose  on borrowers  render  the
scenarios  created  by the  knife-edge  models  infeasible.-16-
4.  Intertemporal  Optimization,  the  Budget  Constraint,  and  Solvency
A critical  shortcoming  of the  knife-edge  analysis  is that  savings
behavior,  which  is closely  tied  to the  accumulation  of foreign  debt,  is not
related  to rational  intertemporal  decision-making  on the  part  of the  borrowing
country  or its  creditors.
A very  basic  formulation  that  introduces  a motive  for  borrowing  _onsiders
a small  borrowing  country  as an entity  with  a given  income  stream,  with  per
period  output  Q . The  country's  behavior  is governed  by that  of a
t
representative,  constituent  individual  (or  dynasty)  that  seeks  to maximize  the
discounted  value  of its  utility  from  consumption. A common  simplification  is
that  utility  is additively  separable  across  time,  and  that  utility  in any
period  t is a concave  function  u(Ct)  of consumption  Ct in period  t.
Consumption  cannot  be negative. The  representative  individual  discounts
future  consumption  by some  factor  A  (which  equals  one  over  one  plus its
discount  rate,  as it is  more  conventionally  defined). Hence  0  is  between  zero
and  one,  with values  nearer  one implying  less  discounting  of the  future. It
can  borrow  and  lend in intornational  credit  markets  at an interest  rate  r,
which  I will  usually  treat  as a constant  to  simplify  notation.
Consider  a time  0 when  the  country's  foreign  debt  is zero.  As of that
point,  its  objective  can  be described  as maximizing  a function  of the  form:
U0 -t  Ou(Ct)  (4.1)
Each  period  t it  chooses  to  borrow  some  net  amount  Bt (defined  as  new
borrowing  less  repayments  of principal  on old  debt),  but  must  pay interest-17  -
rDt  1 on debt  accumulated  as of the  end  of the  previous  period. What is left
over  for  consumption  is then:
Ct  -Qt + Bt - rDt  - Qt +  NTt  (4.2)
while  debt  at the  end  of period  t is:
Dt - Dt 1 + Bt - (l+r)D  t-I  NT
Iterating  the  second  part of equation  (4.3)  backward  to period  0 gives:
t  ti
Dt E  (l+r)  NT..  (4.4)
i=O
Debt  in  period  t is  just the  cumulative  discounted  net  resource  transfers
since  period  0 (when  debt  was zero).
Obviously,  if the  country  faces  absolutely  no limit  on  what it  can  borrow
in any  period,  it  can  attain  an  arbitrarily  high level  of consumption  in any
period  without  defaulting  by financing  debt-service  obligatione  with new
borrowing. What  keeps  a country  from  pursuing  such  a borrowing  strategy?
The  problem  is that  allowing  a country  to do this  would  be inconsistent
with  rational  lender  behavior. Sensible  lenders  would  not enter  into
transactions  with a  country  that  would  imply  a loss. This  means  that,  as of
period  0, the  anticipated  discounted  value  of resource  transfers  that  they
would  provide  the  country  not  exceed  0, or that:
X  NT  C  t-Qt
I  t  <  E  t  s 0.  (4.5)
t=O (l+r)  t-O (l+r)-18-
This last  condition  is often  called  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint.
Dividing  (4.4)  by (l+r) gives:
D  t  NTi
t  E  i  (4.6)
(l+r)  i-O (l+r)
Expressions  (4.5)  and (4.6)  imply  the  following  restrictions  on debt:
Solvency
Substituting  (4.6)  into  (4.5)  gives,  for  any  period  t:
X0  Q -C
r-t+l (1+r)r
Since  consumption  cannot  be negative,  this  condition  implies  that:




the  present  discounted  value  of the  borrowing  country's  remaining  income
stream. Condition  (4.7),  often  called  the  solvlncy  constraint,  states  that
debt  in any  period  cannot  exceed  this  amount  if lenders  are to find  their
relationship  with the  borrower  profitable.-19-
In principle,  the  right  hand side  of (4.7)  could  be infinite,  in  which
case  the  constraint  disappears. This  would  mean that  the  country's  current
and  future  resources  are infinitely  valuable,  which  could  happen  if the
country  grew  on average  at a rate in  excess  of the interest  rate.
Presumably,  the  demand  for  borrowing  on the  part  of such  a country  would
suffice  to drive  the  world  interest  rate  up to the  point  at which  the
constraint  became  binding. As mentioned,  some  of the  literature  on external
debt  talks  of "solvency"  as a condition  that its  growth  rate  exceed  the
interest  rate.  For  a country  to  be permanently  solvent  in this  sense  implies
that  it  have resources  that  are infinitely  valuable,  in  which  case any  level
of debt  is consistent  with  solvency. It is unlikely  that  any  country  meets
this  criterion. A growth  rate in  excess  of the  interest  rate is  almost  surely
a temporary  phenomenon. On the  other  hand,  as discussed  below,  almost  all
sovereign  borrowers  are  probably  solvent  in the  sense  that  the  discounted
present  value  of their  national  resources  exceeds  the  value  of their  external
debt.
The  "Transversality  Condition"
Together,  (4.5)  and (4.6)  imply  that
Dt
lim  t  < 0,  (4.8)
t+  (l+r)
often  called  the  transversality  condition: In order  to realize  a collective
positive  return  on their  loans,  foreign  creditors  cannot  allow  the  discounted
value  of debt in the  infinite  future  to  be positive. As is  clear  from  (4.3)  a
borrowing  strategy  that  never  required  making  net resource  transfers  to-20-
creditors  would  require  that  debt  grow  at  or above  the  rate  of interest,
violating  (4.8). Note that  the  condition  allows  Dt to remain  positive,  i.e.,
the  country  can remain  a  net debtor  forever. Debt  just can't  grow,  on
average,  faster  than  the  interest  rate.
The  country's  problem  then,  can  be seen  as  choosing  NTt in each  period  t
to  maximize  U0 subject  to either  (4.5)  or (4.8). Setting  this  problem  up as a
constrained  maximization,  it  becomes:
@  ~Qt-C
max (  E  [tu(C )  + A(  )])  (4.9)
5  tot=0  (l+r)t
where  A is the  shadow  price  associated  with the  solvency  condition.
The first-order  conditions  for  a maximum  are:
[(10'r)]  u'(C )  A  Vt - 0,...,-  (4.10)
t
With  nonsatiation  (so  that  the  marginal  utility  of consumption  is  always
strictly  positive),  A  is  strictly  positive,  meaning  that the  constraint  is
binding. Optimal  borrowing  thus  implies  that  condition  (4.5)  hold  with
equality,  or that:
co  C
___  - w
t=0 (l+r)t  0.
One implication  of (4.10)  is  that,  given  the  discounted  present  value  of
initial  resources  W0, international  borrowing  and lending  completely  separate
the  timing  of consumption  from  that  of  production. The intertemporal  budget
constraint  is the  only  link  between  the  two. Hence,  given  the  present
r-s  s  ,1  ,4-2,..-
discounted  value  of resources,  the  timing  of their  availability  should  have  no
implications  for  consumption.
A second  implication  of (4.10)  is that  consumption  rises  or falls  over
time  depending  upon  whether  (l+r)p  is  larger  or smaller  than  one,  or whether
the  world interest  rate is  higher  or lower  than  the  country's  time  discount
rate.
As an example,  consider  a borrowing  country  whose  representative  consumer




where  the (nonnegative)  parameter  a corresponds  to the (constant,  in this
case)  elasticity  of the  marginal  utility  of income,  or,  equivalently,  the
degree  of relative  risk  aversion. The  solution  involves  choosing:
ct  [(l+r)p]  t/ela 1  la (1+r)  (1-a)/laW
Say that  Qt grows  at a constant  rate  g.  Then
(l+r)Q 0
0  r-g
while  the  present  discounted  value  of current  and future  resources  in  any
subsequent  period  is (l+g)  WO.  Debt  at the  end of  period  t-l is  then:
co  t  t/a
Dt  - t  '  -W((l+g)  - [(l+r)i]).
t-1  ~~~0-22-
The  country  becomes  a debtor  if  1+g  > [(1+r)#]  /  and  a creditor  otherwise.
Note that  debt  grows  faster  the  higher  the  exogenous  growth  rate  of
income,  the  higher  the  discount  factor,  and  the  lower  the  rate  of interest.
The analysis  can  be extended  to incorporate  a productive  role for
capital. As long  as the  production  technology  and  other  factors  of endowmenit
are  exogenous,  however,  little  in this  analysis  is  affected. Say, for
example,  that  output  in  period  t is  a function  F(Kt,L  ,t), where  Lt is a set
of  exogenous  factor  supplies  such  as labor  and  land,  and  where  F  is
homogeneous  in  Kt and  Lt.  Optimal  investment  requires  investing  up to the
point  at  which  FK  r, wl.re  FK is  the  marginal  product  of capital. Let
*
K  (Lt,t)  denote  the  value  of  K consistent  with  optimal  investment.  Defining
Qt  - F(K*,Lt,t)  and  redefining  fore5gD  debt  Dt as Dt  + Kt - Kof  where  K  is
the  period  0 capital  stock.  and  Dt is  derived  as before,  the  analysis  follows
as above.
In this  case,  even in  the  long  run, in  contrast  to  what "knife-edge"
analysis  discussed  above  suggests,  the  growth  rate  is invariant  to the level
of debt,  and  to economic  policy  more ger.erally.  It is deterrnined  only  by
exogenous  changes  in technology  and  factor  supplies. However,  the  recent
growth  models  we turn  to  next reintroduce  reasons  why debt  has implications
for  growth.-23-
5.  Debt  and  Growth: "Endogenous  Gr^wth"  Models
The revival  of interest  in growth  theory  in the  1980s,  spurred  by papers
of Romer (1986)  and  Lucas  (1988),  suggests  a richer  relationship  between  debt
and  growth. While  the  literature  rests  on more  neoclassical  assumptions  about
tastes  and  technology  than the  "knife-edge"  4nalysis,  in some  ways it
resembles  them  more than  the  neoclassical  analysis  that  intervened. In
particular,  it  revives  the  notion  that  foreign  debt  has implications  for  the
long-run  growth  rate. Unfortunately,  the  literature  is too  undeveloped  to
provide  any  robust  results. Consider  the  following  two  models  that  have  very
different  implications  for  how  changes  ia  world  credit  market  conditions
affect  growth.
5.1  The Lucas  Model
The following  analysis  draws  on Lucas (1988):
Consider  an economy  with  a technology  given  by:
Qt - KP(u  L )  I-Ht  f+t
t  t  ~~~~~  tt  tt
where  Qt is output,  K  t is the  capital  stock,  Lt is the  labor  force,  and  Ht
represents  the  state  of "technological  knowledge"  of  a typical  worker  in the
economy,  all  at period  t.  The  variable  ut,  which  lies  between  zera  and  one,
represents  the  share  of an average  worker's  time  spent  working,  rather  than
developing  technological  knowledge. (Assume  for  now that  all  workers  spend
the  same  amount  of tiwe  working,  regardless  of their  knowledge. We later  show-24-
that  they  will in fact  do so.)  The  capital  share  is  P,  which lies  between  zero
and  one,  and y  is  a nonnegative  parameter.
A worker's  technological  knowledge  contributes  to current  output  in two
ways.  First,  it increases  the  productivity  of the  worker  with that  knowledge
in  proportion. Hence  worker  i  with knowledge  Hit in  period  :  working  a
fraction  of  his time  uit  contributes  u  itHit  to the  labor  force  that  period.
The  worker  captures  the  return  to this  aspect  of  his  knowledge  by earning  a
proportionately  higher  wage.  Second,  if  Ht is the  average  state  of knowledge
in the  economy,  output  is affected  beyond  what is implied  by the  contribution
of  H  to the  effective  labor  force  in  proportion  H't.  Returns  to capital  and
t  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t
effective  labor  exhaust  production,  so these  general  returns  are  not
appropriated.
Separating  these  two  roles  for technological  knowledge,  the  production
relationship  can  be rewritten:
Qt =  KpEt pHz
where  Et  =  utHtLt,  the  effective  labor  force. The  wage (per  unit  of effective
labor)  is thus:
t  (l-p)[K /(U H L  t)]  H
There  is  only  one  produced  good,  which  can  be used for  investment  or for
consumption. (Issues  concerning  the  relative  price  of capital  are thus  not
addressed: The  price  is  one.)  Hence  the  capital  stock  grows  according  to the
relationship  Kt  =  It - WKC,  where,  again,  6 is  the  rate  of depreciation
(assumed  constant).-25-
Workers  inherit  a given  state  of technological  knowhow. They can  add to
the  existing  state  by allocating  time  toward  that  purpose,  which  takes  away
from  their  efforts  toward  current  production. The increase  in the  state  of
technical  knowhow  in  period  t is given  by the  function:
Ht  tHt(l-U  t)
where  e is  some  nonnegative  parameter. Note  that  a given  amount  of effort  at
acquiring  new  knowledge  makes  a contribution  that is  proportional  to the
existing  stock  of knowledge  in  period  t.  Hence  gH  Ht/Ht,  the  growth  rate  in
the  stock  of  knowledge,  is:
gH  =  e(l-ud).
Aside,  then,  from  the  two  contributions  that  knowhow  makes  to  production
that  have already  been mentioned  (augmenting  the  current  effective  labor  force
in  production  and  enhancing  current  productivity  generally)  knowledge
increases  the  productivity  of time  spent  adding  to technological  knowledge
(learning).
Each  period  t the  representative  individual  chooses  a level  of
consumption  ct and  an allocation  of time  between  work and  learning  u  . The
standard  assumption  is  that  preferences  are intertemporally  additively
separable  and  display  constant  relative  risk  aversion. Denoting  the  discoun_
factor  by p  and the  elasticity  of the  marginal  utility  of consumption  by a, at
any  period  0 the  individual's  problem  (taking  into  account  the  growth  of  his
household)  is to  choose  ct  and  ut each  period  to  maximize:-26-
1-a
n  ~~1  ^o
subject  to the  equation  of motion  for  wealth  Wt
Wt  - rW  t+Wtu  tHt Lt  ctLt
where  r is  the interest  rate (again  treated  as constant)  and  wt the  wage  per
unit  of effective  labor,  and the  equation  of motion  for  an individual's  state
of knowledge:
t  Ht f(l-  t)-
To examine  the  role  of foreign  capital  consider  two  versions  of the
model,  one  in  which  all  capital  investment  is  financed  by national  saving
(financial  autarky)  and another  in  which  the  capital  market  is open
internationally,  so that the  economy  we examine  can  borrow  or lend  at a given
constant  world interest  rate  r.
As does  Lucas  (1988),  I  focus  on a  balanced  growth  path or steady  state,
in  which  output  and  the  capital  stock  grow  at the  same  rate  g.  In a
competitive  equilibrium,  both  under  financial  autarky  and  with foreign
borrowing,  if - > 0 then  the  stock  of knowledge  grows  at gH,  where
_  (r.f-n)
if this  rate lies  below  the  maximum  feasible  rate  f.  Here,  as  before  n - L/L,
the  rate  of growth  of the  labor  force  (again  assumed  constant). If -y  - 0 or-27-
if  g  H>  f  the  economy  achieves  a steady  state  in  which  the  stock  of  human
capital  is  constant,  so that  the  economy  reaches  a point  after  which  u - 1.
There  is  no further  growth  growth  in output  or wages.  (A  no-growth  outcome
can  also  occur  whenever  c  <  r, although  positive  steady-state  growth  may also
be a  possibility.)
If  a strictly  positive  growth  rate  is feasible,  however,  output  and  the
capital  stock  grow  at:
°  -p  9H
while  the  wage rate  grows  at:
&W - r-c-n
Somewhat  surprisingly,  as long  as strictly  positive  steady-state  growth
is  feasible,  the interest  rate r  affects  growth  positively  while  the
productivity  of time spent  acquiring  knowl_dge  e  affects  growth  negatively.
The reason  is  that  when future  income  is discounted  more and  when time  spent
developing  knowledge  is less  productive,  more  growth  in  wages  is needed  to
compensate  workers  for investing  in  developing  knowledge. Less paradoxically,
if the  interest  rate  exceeds  a level  r, where
r-n+~~+- r e n +  !:~O  e
1 -p
strictly  positive  steady-state  growth  is  no longer  viable. Instead,  the
steady-state  outcome  is no growth.
Say,  for  example,  that  the  labor  force  grows  at an annual  rate  of 2  per-28-
cent  while  the  maximum  feasible  steady  state  growth  in  technology  (f)  is  6 per
cent,  and f  - y - 1/3. Ongoing  growth  requires  an interest  rate  below  11  per
cent.
If the  interest  rate is in  fact  10  per cent  then  technological  knowledge
grows  at 4 per  cent  while  output  and the  capital  stock  grow  at 6 per cent.
The  wage grows  at 2  per  cent.
A  Closed  Economy
If the  economy  has  no access  to foreign  capital,  so that  the  accumulation
of domestic  physical  capital  is fully  financed  through  domestic  savings,  then
the  steady-state  interest  rate  is  r5,  where:
r  p  +  ag
and  where  gc is the  growth  rate  in  per  worker  consumption,  which,  with
balanced  growth,  is equal  to g-n.  Substituting  this  term  into  the  expression
for  gH above  gives,  as the  growth  rate  in  knowledge:
gH  c  (;+)[p-  -(l+a)n].
Say  that  the  degree  of relative  risk  aversion  is 1.  (Empirical  estimates
for  most economies  place  it  between  one  and three.) The growth  rate in
knowledge  is then 2n+e-p. Because  of their  effect  on the  interest  rate,
population  growth  and the  productivity  of time  spent  acquiring  new technology
now  enhance  growth,  while  discounting  reduces  it.  The feasibility  of positive
growth  now requires  that  the  discount  factor  not  exceed  twice  the  rate  of-29-
labor  force  growth.
An  Open  Economy
Say  instead  that  the  economy  can  borrow  and  lend  at a constant  world
interest  rate  r.  In this  case  individuals'  decisions  about  investment  in
human  capital  are  independent  of their  own  preferences,  in our  case  of the
parameters  p and  a.  The  rate  of growth  depends  only  on the  technological
parameters  and the  world  interest  rate. Access  to the  world  capital  market
can  raise  the  growth  rate (1)  if domestic  taste  parameters  are  such that
positive  growth  is feasible  with  borrowing  but infeasible  under  autarky  or (2)
if  the  steady-state  growth  rate  under  autarky  is  positive  but  below  that  under
free  capital  mobility.
5.2  The Cohen  Model
Cohen (1991)  develops  an alternative,  somewhat  simpler  discrete-time
endogenous  growth  model  that is  more in  keeping  with the  assumptions  of the
two-gap  literature. In  particular,  output  is proportional  to the  capital
stock. Hence,  in  period  t,  Qt  aKt,  where  a  is an exogenous  constant. The
capital  stock  evolves  according  to the  law  of  motion:
Kt  - (l-6)Kt-,  +  It
where,  again,  S  is  the  rate  at  which  capital  depreciates. Following
assumptions  that  appear  in  an earlier  investment  literature,  Cohen  assumes
that  investment  uses resources  beyond  what is needed  to  contribute  to the-30-
capital  stock. In particular,  adding  an amount  It (gross  of depreciation)
requires  a sacrifice  of current  resources  of Jt,  where:
it  It  [1+(0/2)(It/Kd)] .
The  parameter  0  is  meant  to capture  capital  installation  costs.
As in the  Lucas  model,  the  competitive  equilibrium  of an open  economy
facing  a given  world  interest  rate  will  entail  the  maximization  of the  present
discounted  value  of output  at world  prices. The  consequent  growth  rate  of
output  g° is  given  by:
0 - r - '(6+r)2  4(a-r-6)/O
The  expression  for  the  growth  rate  of a closed  economy  with a
representative  agent  with strictly  ccncave  preferences  is  more complicated.
Since  general  results  are  hard to come  by, I  provide  some  numerical
calculations.  Table  1  presents  the  growth  rates  for  the  open  and  closed
economies  under  alternative  parameter  values  for  a, the  discount  factor  f,  r,
6, and  0.  In order  to  maintain  more  or less  comparable  discount  factors  for
the  closed  and  open  cases,  P  is  set  equal  to l/(l+r)  (although,  as with the
Lucas  analysis,  if  consumption  is  growing  then  the  interest  rate  will  exceed
th(  discount  rate).
Note that,  in contrast  with the  Lucas  model,  the  growth  rate  of the  open
Cohen  economy  falls  when the  interest  rate  goes  up.  This is  simply  because  a
higher  world  interest  rate  makes  it less  worthwhile  to allocate  resources
toward  future  rather  than  toward  current  consumption,  while  higher  growth  does
not increase  the  return  to investment  in  physical  capital. In the  Lucas-31-
model,  on the  other  hand,  higher  growth  increases  the  return  to  human  capital.
Hence  higher  growth  is needed  to offset  the  effect  of a  higher  interest  rate,
which  reduces  the  incentive  to accumulate  human  capital.
Also  not surprising  is the  result  that  growth  is  higher  when capital  is
more  productive  and  is lower  the  higher  the  depreciation  rate  and  the  cost  of
installation,  as reflected  in the  parameter  0.  Note that  the  open  economy
grows  as fast  or faster  than  the  closed  economy  when  both grow  at  positive
rates,  but grows  as slow  or slower  when  both rates  are  negative. Whatever
tendency  of  motion  the  economy  has, its  direction  is  exaggerated  by openness.
To conclude,  both the  Cohen  and  Lucas  models,  as  well as a  number  of
other  treatments  of endogenous  growth,  provide  a means  of relating  foreign
indebtedness  to long-run  growth. Unfortunately,  at this  stage  the  literature
has  not  provided  any  general  conclusions  about  such  essential  issues  as the
relationship  between  the  world interest  rate  and the  growth  rate.TABLE 1
alpha  beta  r  delta  phi  open  closed
0.60  0.95  0.05  0.05  100.00  0.05  0.01
0.60  0.94  0.06  0.05  100.00  0.01  0.00
0.60  0.93  0.07  0.05  100.00  0.00  -0.00
0.60  0.92  0.08  0.05  100.00  -0.01  -0.00
0.60  0.92  0.09  0.05  100.00  -0.01  -0.01
0.60  0.91  0.10  0.05  100.00  -0.02  -0.01
0.60  0.90  0.11  0.05  100.00  -0.02  -0.01
0.60  0.89  0.12  0.05  100.00  -0.02  -0.02
0.60  0.88  0.13  0.05  100.00  -0.02  *0.02
0.60  0.88  0.14  0.05  100.00  -0.03  -0.02
0.60  0.87  0.15  0.05  100.00  -0.03  -0.02
1.00  0.95  0.05  0.05  100.00  ERR  0.04
1.00  0.94  0.06  0.05  100.00  ERR  0.03
1.00  0.93  0.07  0.05  100.00  ERR  0.03
1.00  0.92  0.08  0.05  100.00  ERR  0.02
1.00  0.92  0.09  0.05  100.00  0.04  0.02
1.00  0.91  0.10  0.05  100.00  0.03  0.01
1.00  0.90  0.11  0.05  100.00  0.02  0.01
1.00  0.89  0.12  0.05  100.00  0.01  0.01
1.00  0.88  0.13  0.05  100.00  0.00  0.00
1.00  0.88  0.14  0.05  100.00  -0.00  -0.00
0.60  0.91  0.10  0.10  100.00  -0.08  -0.06
0.60  0.91  0.10  0.05  200.00  -0.03  -0.03
1.00  0.91  0.10  0.10  100.00  -0.05  -0.04
1.00  0.91  0.10  0.05  200.00  -0.02  -0.01
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6.  Sovereign  Risk
All the  analysis  so far  rests  on an assumption  that  sovereign  debtors
will  meet  debt  service  obligations  to  foreign  creditors  as long  as they  remain
solvent,  meaning  that  debt  obligations  do not  exceed  the  present  discounted
value  of national  resources. There  are  reasons  why sovereign  debt  may  pose
problems  before  the  solvency  constraint  bites',  however.
The Public  Finance  Problem
An issue  in  the  case  of sovereign  debt is the  solvency  of the  sovereign
government  itself,  as opposed  to that  of the  nation  as a  whole.  Even if the
government  perfectly  represents  the  interests  of the  population,  the
administrative  cost  and  excess  burden  of taxation  can  reduce  the  resources
that  a government  can  obtain  to  meet a debt-service  obligation  below  what is
available  nationally. The  problem  debtor  countries  do in fact  seem  to  have
particular  difficulty  raising  tax  revenue. The  capital  flight  phenomenon
suggests  the  extent  to  which  a significant  portion  of  nctionally-owned
resources  may lie  beyond  the  grasp  of a sovereign  debtor.
In  fact,  depending  on  how debt-seru'ice  obligations  are financed,  even  a
small  amount  of debt can,  in some  circumstances,  have  a devastating  effect  on
investment  and  government  revenue. To make the  argument  in its  starkest
terms,  consider  a government  that  relies  on proportional  taxation  of capital
income  for  all of its  tax  revenue. Hence  T - tg(K),  where  T is tax  revenue,  t
is the  tax  rate on income  from investment,  which  is itself  a function  g(K)  of
the  amount  inv3sted  K;  g is increasing  and  concave  in  K.- 33.-
Say that  the  government  owes an  amount  D to foreign  creditors,  and  D must
be covered  by tax  revenue. Potential  investors  know that  the  government  owes
w
D, and  can invest  their  funds  elsewhere  and  earn  a return  r . Investing  in
the  debtor  country  earns  them  an after-tax  return  rH _ (l-t)g'(K). Investors
must decide  where  to invest  before  the  actual  tax  rate is  known.  (It  does  not
matter  for  our  purposes  whether  these  potential  investors  are  nationals  or
foreigners; all  that  matters  is  that  investment  income  in the  debtor  country
is taxed  while  foreign  investment  income  is  not.)  In order  to meet its
debt-service  obligations  the  government  sets  a tax-rate  t  - D/g(K). Hence  the
after-tax  rate  of return  is
rH--(K)  - [1-  D  )]g'(K), rH(K)  g-K
which  can  be increasing  in  K for  K near  zero  but  decreases  in  K or.ce  K becomes
very large. If  we assume  that  individual  investors  are  small  relative  to the
total  number  (so  that  each investor  ignores  the  effect  of  his own investment
on the  total  amount  K) investmont  will occur  up to the  point  at which
r (K)  r  if  K is strictly  positive,  while  if
[l-D/g(O)]g'(0)  <  rW  (6.1)
then  K  0 is an equilibrium  outcome. The  reason  is that  the  income  from  any
investment  by a single,  small  investor  acting  on  his own  will  be taxed  at a
very  high rate,  since  the  tax  base  will  be so small.
Figure  1 illustrates  a quite  possible  relationship  between  r (K),  K and
rw.  At K ,  [l-D/g(K*)]g'(K*)  - r . Investment is sufficient to allow a
competitive  after-tax  return  even  after  enough  is  collected  to repay  the  debt.w
r
/~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  H  )HK F'I (K)
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(Also,  at K*,  r (K)  is  declining  in  K  so that  K  is  locally  stable.)
Aowever,  condition  (6.1)  is  also  satisfied. When the initial  amount  of
capital  is zero,  a small  level  of investment  is taxed  at such  a high  rate it
is  not  worth  making.
The  model,  which  is developed  further  in Eaton  (1987),  illustrates
several  points:
First,  it suggests  why debt  might  be associated  with capital  flight,  as
domestic  investors  invest  elsewhere  to  avoid  the  tax  obligations  associated
with  debt.  Note that  K* could  exceed  D, so that  the  equilibrium  with  positive
investment  could  involve  a positive  net  resource  transfer,  while  the
equilibrium  wich  no investment  would  involve  a negative  one.
Second,  it  su,gests  that  governments  with large  debt  obligations  would  do
better  to rely  on taxes  that  fall  on internationally  immobile  factors,  like
land.
Third,  it suggests  why a government  could  benefit  from  being  able to
commit  itself  somehow  to a  particular  tax  rate  in advance  of investment
decisions.
Why,  given  the  public  finance  problems  associated  with sovereign
borrowing,  was so  much  borrowing  done  by governments  rather  than  by private
entities? There  are  irobably  many  reasons. But  given  the  nature  of contract
enforcement  and  bankruptcy  procedures  in  many  debtor  countries,  lending  to
private  borrowers  would  not  have avoided  problems  associated  with sovereign
risk.  Lenders  would  have  had  to rely  on the  borrower's  government  to enforce
loan  contracts  and  to administer  bankruptcy  procedures  fairly. In fact,  much
of what  was  borrowed  privately  was  ultimately  assumed  by borrower  governments,
even  when loans  were  not guaranteed  by the  borrower's  government.
Diaz-Alejandro  (1984)  tells  of private  Chilean  banks  that  borrowed-35-
substantial  amounts  from  foreign  commercial  banks.  The  loans  were n-ot
guaranteed  by the  Chilean  government. The  Chilean  banks invested  the  funds
quite  recklessly,  and  ultimately  went  bankrupt. The foreign  commercial  banks
persuaded  the  Chilean  government  to assume  the  liabilities,  threatening  to
worsen  the  government's  own  credit  terms  if it didn't. The  point  seems  to  be
that  the  foreign  commercial  banks  did  not  distinguish  between  private
borrowers  in Chile  and  the  Chilean  government,  and  held the  government
responsible  for  the  outcome  of all  of its  investments  there.
The  Liquidity  Problem
Another  problem  that  is frequently  mentioned  in  discussion  of debt
repayment  is that  of liquidity:  A sovereign  debtor  may  be solvent,  but  not
have resources  available  to  meet  a cutrent  debt-service  obligation. If the
borrower  is  truly  creditworthy,  however,  the  question  arises  as to why
creditors  won't  lend  what is  needed  to meet  the  current  obligation. This
issue  comes  up in  our  discussion  of the  options  facing  a creditor  in  dealing
with a debtor  not paying  what it  owes in  section  S.
The  Enforcement Problem
Most  domestic  borrowing  occurs  in  a context  in  which  creditors  have
significant  legal  rights  over  the  assets  of debtors. In the  case  of secured
debt,  specific  assets  that  the  creditor  can  seize  in the  event  of default
serve  as collateral. In the  case  of unsecured  debt,  a default  can lead  to the
general  liquidation  of the  debtor's  assets,  with the  proceeds  distributed  to
creditors. In either  case,  the  transfer  of assets  from  debtor  to creditor  in-36-
the  event  of nonpayment  serves  the  dual  purpose  of  placing  a lower  bound  on
what the  creditor  can  recover  if default  does  occur,  and  providing  an
incentive  for  the  debtor  not to default  in the  first  place.
If in fact  creditors  can  seize  all  of the  debtor's  assets,  and  can
realize  a return  on them  that  is  at least  as high  as what the  debtor  could,
then  the  lenders  can  issue  up to the  discounted  present  value  of the  debtor's
income  without  risk. The solvency  constraint  is thus  the  relevant  upper  bound
on what  can safely  be lent.
In the  context  of sovereign  debt,  however,  a creditor's  legal  remedies  do
not  usually  provide  him the  means  to  obtair  a significant  portion  of the
debtor's  assets. The  czeditor  might  be able  to use  its  own  legal  system  to
obtain  the  debtor's  foreign  assets,  but to the  extent  that  the  debtor  is a net
debtor,  these  will  not suffice  to  compensate  lenders. The  natural  question
then  is  what incentive  a sovereign  debtor  has to repay  any (net)  debt  since  it
does  not  stand  to lose  assets  of comparable  value  in the  event  of default.
Answers  to this  question  are  the  topic  of Section  7.  First,  however,
some  implications  of the  enforcement  problem  deserve  mention.
Credit Rationing and the  Monitoring of Indebtedness
A creditor's  inability  to enforce  aspects  of loan  contracts  has several
implications  for  the  relationship  between  creditors  and  debtors,  which  I
illustrate  in  a simple,  two-period  framework.
Say  that  in the  first  period  a debtor  borrows  some  amount  L, incurring  a
debt  service  obligation  D  - L(l+r)  in the  second  period. Here r, of course,
is  the interest  rate  on the  loan.
Say  that  payment  of anything  less  than  what is  owed  causes  the  debtor  to-37-
suffer  a  penalty  equivalent  to the  loss  of an amount  P  of income  in  period  2.
Hence  the  debtor  will  pay all  that  it owes  if  D <  P, and  default  if  D >  P.
(For  simplicity,  I resolve  indifference  on the  debtor's  part in favor  of the
creditor.) Creditors,  who realize  this  and  can  monitor  total  indebtedness,
will  ensure  that  L(l+r)  does  not  exceed  P.  As long  as indebtedness  satisfies
this  constraint,  loans  are  perfectly  safe,  and  competitive  lenders  should
w provide  them  at the  safe  world  interest  rate  r
However,  the  debtor  may  want to  borrow  more than  P/(l+r  w) at this  rate.
But if it  does it  will default  the  next  period. Lenders  will therefore
constrain  loans  not to  exceed  this  amount. The  consequence  is  credit
rationing: competitive  lenders  provide  less  than  what the  debtor  wants  to
borrow  at the interest  cate  they  charge. The  interest  rate  does  not rise  in
response  to this  excess  demand  because  total  indebtedness  in  the  next  period
would  then  exceed  P, ensuring  default. No risk  premium  could  compensate
lenders  for  certain  default.
Credit  rationing  requires  that  creditors  know the  debtor's  total  debt.
In this  simple  example,  if  they  were ignorant  of it,  there  could  be no
competitive  lending  at all.  If there  were,  the  debtor  would  borrow  more than
what it  would  be willing  to repay  and  then  default. Knowing  this,  no one
would  lend.
This  result  points  to the  role  of accurate  information  about  the  stock  of
total  indebtedness  in sovereign  debt.  In  this  situation  the  debtor  benefits
from  public  observability  of its  total  indebtedness.  If its  level  of  debt
could  not  be observed,  it  could  not  borrow.
Lack  of information  need  not  close  the  loan  market  entirely. Following
Kletzer  (1985),  say that  the  cost  of default  is  nearly  infinite  with some
probability  Xr and  P  <  c  with  probability  1-Xr.  A loan  requiring  repayment  of-38  -
P or less  is then  perfectly  safe,  since  it  will  be repaid  in any  event,  while
a loan  requiring  repayment  of  more than  this  amount  will  be repaid  only  with
probability  X  (when  the  cost  of default  is  very  high).  If indebtedness  is
unobservable  then  risk-neutral  lenders  will charge  an interest  rate
rU  (l-n+r  )/r  to compensate  for  the  risk  of  default. But, as Kletzer  (1985)
shows,  if  debt is  observable  the  debtor  may  prefer  to  have loans  rationed  at
P/(l+r)  in  order  to  benefit  from  improved  credit  terms.-39-
7.  The Incentive  to Repay
A common  assumption  is that  default  on a current  debt-service  obligation
will  prevent  a  borrower  from  obtaining  new  credit,  at least  in the  current
period. But  losing  access  to current  credit  provides  an incentive  to  meet a
current  debt-service  obligation  if and  only  if  potential  new lending  exceeds
current  debt-service  obligations,  so that  the  debtor  receives  a net  resource
transfer  from  creditors  if it repays,  but  would  receive  nothing  if it did  not.
As discussed  in section  3,  however,  creditors  can earn  a competitive
return  on sovereign  lending  only  if the  debtor  at some  point  makes  net
resource  transfers  to its  creditors. As the  data in  the  Appendix  show,
sovereign  debtors  have in fact  made  large  net  resource  transfers  to their
creditors  during  the  1980s. The  question  then,  is  why sovereign  debtors  make
net resource  transfers  to their  creditors.
7.1  Sanctions
Much of the  literature  on sovereign  debt  has simply  asserted  that  the
debtor  suffers  some  exogenously-specified  penalty  beyond  the loss  of current
new lending  if it defaults. A particular  justification  for  this  assumption  is
that  default  allows  creditors  to intercept  payments  that  the  debtor  might  make
to foreign  exporters,  or  payments  that  it  might  receive  from  foreign
importers. The  cost of evading  the  creditor's  attempts  to intercept  these
payments  (through  barter  arrangements,  for  example)  would  reduce  the  debtor's
gains  from  trade.
Say  that  this  penalty  causes  the  debtor  to incur  a loss  with  a value  in-40-
terms  of its  permanent  income  of P if it defaults. If,  subsequent  to the
default,  the  borrower  can  resume  transacting  at the  world interest  rate then
the  desirability  of default  depends  on a comparison  of the  discounted  value  of
net resource  transfers  to current  creditors  associated  with the  debt,  which
should  correspond  to the  current  value  of the  debt  itself,  and  the  cost  of the
penalty.
A common  assumption  is that  P depends  positively  upon the  debtor's
subsequent  income. Why it  should  is  not  clear. If default  leads  to  a
deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  then  the  argument  must  be made that  the
gains  from  trade  increase  with  income. There  is no presumption  that they  do.
Growth  in income  might  be "import  biased,"  for  example,  so that  higher  income
implies  less  reliance  on foreign  trade. 3 Nevertheless,  the  assumption  that
the  cost  of default,  and  hence  how  much foreign  creditors  can  extract  from  a
sovereign  debtor,  is central  to a  number  of major  results  on debt  forgiveness
and  debt  buybacks,  the  topics  of sections  8 and  9.
7.2  Maintaining  a Reputation  for  Repayment
Another  reason  why a debtor  might  choose  to repay  debt  is to maintain
access  to foreign  credit  markets  on favorable  terms. Historically,  widespread
default  on loans  to developing  countries  has lead  to a subsequent  loss  of
access  to credit  markets. Episodes  of widespread  default  among  Latin  American
debtors  was followed  by a virtual  loss  of access  to credit  markets  for  these
countries. Subsequent  to  a series  of defaults  in the  1930s,  for  example,
Latin  American  countries  were  unable  to raise  money  from  private  international
capital  markets  until  the  1970s.
3See  the  discussion  in  Gersovitz  (1983).-41-
There  is,  however,  disagreement  about  the  extent  to  which  an individual
developing  country's  repayment  performances  affected  its  credit  terms  relative
to those  of developing  countries  as a whole. Hence  it is  not clear  to  what
extent  creditors  distinguished  among  individual  countries  in  relating  credit
terms  to  past performance,  or judged  developing  countries  as a group.
Eichengreen  and  Portes  (1990)  indicate  that,  during  the  1920s  and 1930s,
credit  terms  did  reflect  previous  repayment  within  that  period,  but that  a
record  of default  in the  1930s  did  not  worsen  credit  availability  in  the
1970s. Ozier  (1989a),  on the  other  hand,  using  a sample  that  excludes
countries  that  did  not exist  in the  1930s,  finds  that  among  countries  that
existed  in  both  periods,  a  history  of  successful  repayment  in the  1930s
improved  credit  terms  in the  1970s. Furthermore,  Ozler  (1989b)  finds  that  a
history  of successful  repayment  within  the  1970s  improved  subsequent  credit
terms  within  the  period. Nevertheless,  even  if creditors  lump  developing
countries  together  in assessing  their  creditworthiness,  a loss  of access  to
foreign  credit  markets  can  serve  as an incentive  for  an individual  debtor  to
repay. Group  treatment  of developing  country  debtors  by creditors  simply
introduces  a negative  externality  to  a country's  default  decision.
As Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989b)  have emphasized,  losing  access  to loans  from
foreign  credit  markets  does  not  suffice,  by itself,  to  serve  as an incentive
to repay.  If  a sovereign  debtor  in default  can  somehow  continue  to enforce
its  own  loan  contracts  with its  own  foreign  debtors  at the  world interest  rate
then,  if the  only  consequence  of default  is inability  to  borrow  again,  at some
point  a debtor  will  be called  upon  to transfer  so much to its  creditors  that
it  would  prefer  to default  and  invest  what it owes  on its  own  account. From
then  on it can remain  a  net creditor  and  do at least  as well  as it  could  have
if it repaid  and  borrowed  again.-42-
The question  arises  as to  why a sovereign  debtor  in default  could  itself
enforce  a loan  contract. The  discussion  up through  section  5 implicitly
assumed  two-sided  automatic  enforcement,  that  the  country  in question  will
repay  its  debts  as along  as it  has the  resources  to do so,  and could  rest
assured  that  the  rest  of the  world  would  repay  any loans  it  made.  Other
literature  (e.g.,  Eaton  and  Gersovitz,  1981,  Grossman  and  van  Huyck,  1988)
implicitly  assumes  no automatic  enforcement: Any  credit  arrangement  would  be
honored  only  as long  as credit  arrangements  had  always  been  honored  in the
past.  Kletzer  and  Wright  (1990)  have shown  that,  as long  as all  parties  to
any  credit  arrangement  face (even  temporary)  exclusion  from  credit  markets  as
a consequence  of default  then  positive  amounts  of  borrowing  and  lending  can  be
sustained. Bulow  and  Rogoff's  contribution  is to show  that  reputation  alone
will  not sustain  lending  if there  is one-sided  automatic  enforcement  in the
credit  market.
The  result  has  been  misinterpreted,  however,  to  mean that  a threatened
loss  of access  to international  credit  markets  in  general  (financial  autarky)
is insufficient  to sustain  borrowing  and  repayment. See, for  example,  Cohen
(1991,  p. 94).  Sustaining  nonzero  net transfers  requires,  however,  that  at  no
point  in the  relationship  between  the  borrower  and  lenders  is it  certain  that
subsequent  net resource  transfers  from  one  to the  other  will  be in  just one
direction.
The following  model  illustrates  how the  threat  of financial  autarky  can
sustain  some transfer  of resources  between  a  borrower  and  the  rest  of the
world.
For simplicity,  consider  the  simple  economy  treated  in  Section  4 with an
exogenous  output  Qt each  period  t facing  a constant  world interest  rate r.  At
any  period  t its  utility  is given  by u(C  t) where  Ct is  period  t  consumption..43-
the  function  u is incrtasing  and concave. The country's  discount  factor  is
6  < l/(l+r). Its  present  discounted  value  utility  Ut at any time  t is thus:
ut  X  E  t u(C)  (7.1)
r*t
The country's  debt  evolves  according  to  the  equation:
Dt+l  -Dt(l+r)  +  NTt
Net  resource  transfers  NTt - C  - Qt are  subject  to the  solvency  constraint:
OD  NT
E  t  20.  (7.2)
t=O (l+r)t
So far,  all  is  just as in section  4.  In addition,  however,  the
enforcement  constraint  requires  that,  at any  time,  maintaining  its
relationship  with the  interrational  financial  community  is  at least  as
advantageous  as severing  its  ties (by  failing  to make  a net  resource  transfer
that is  expected  of it),  and  enduring  financial  autarky  thereafter,  consuming
its  endowment. Hence,  at each  period  t it  must  be the  case that  the
consumption  path Cr provided  by particip?.ion  in  world  financial  markets
satisfies:
CD  _.t(  X  ~1- E  rt u(C )2  E  t  tu(Q  ); t - 0,...  ,  . (7.3)
r-t  r-t
Sensible  creditors  will  restrict  the  debtor  to  debt  and repayment
profiles  that  satisfy  not  only  the  solvency  constraint  (7.2)  but the-44-
enforcement  constraints  (7.3)  as  well.  The  debtor's  problem  is  thus  to
maximize  (7.1)  subject  to (7.2)  and (7.3). The relevant  optimization  problem
is now  given  by the  Lagrangian:
max (  I  P  u(C  t) + pt  Ep  [u(C)  - u(Qr)]  + A(  t))  (7.4)
Ct  t-O  r-t  (1+r)
where  A is again  the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the  solvency
constraint  (7.2)  while  pt are  the (undiscounted)  Lagrange  multipliers
associated  with the  enforcement  constraints  (7.3).
The first-order  conditions  for  a  maximum  are  now:
t  t
[(l+r)p)  u'(Ct)(l +  A;  t - 0,...  ,.
Raising  consumption  in  any  period  not  only  contributes  to  utility
directly  but contributes  toward  relaxing  the  enforcement  constraints  of the
current  and  prior  periods.
Say that  u(C )  - log(C  ), (l+r)p  <  1, and  Qt  - Q  if t is even  while  Qt
t  t
QH if t is  odd,  where  QH  >  QL > 0.  Hence  income  fluctuates  between  a high and
low  value.  Since  consumption  is subject  to  declining  marginal  utility,  the
country  has an interest  in  maintaining  access  to the  world  capital  market  to
smooth  consumption.
From the  perspective  of any  period  in  which  income  is low, the  present
value  of future  resources  discounted  at the  world  interest  rate is:
L H
W  (l+r)[(l+r)Q  +Q I
r  r(2+r)-45-
In the  absence  of any  enforcement  problem  the  optimal  consumption  profile
satisfies:
*  t(P) Ct  - [(l+r)p]  (l-p)W 0 t 
The assumption  that 6  <  l+r  implies  that,  absent  any  enforcement  constraint,
consumption  would  diminish  over  time,  approaching  zero  as t becomes  large.
Since  the  country  is  more impatient  than  world  capital  markets,  it  exchanges
present  for  future  consumption.
At some  critical  point  t*,  then,  it  would  be the  case  that  the  C  <  QL
t
for  all  t  2 t*.  From that  point  on the  optimal  borrowing  program  would  call
upon  the  country  to  make  net resource  transfers  to  creditors  every  period.
Obviously  the  country  would  do better  to  default  on its  debt and  consume  its
endowment  thereafter. Hence  the  enforcement  constraint  must  affect  the
consumption  path.  How  much  borrowing  can  still  occur?
If  Q  >  (l+r)#Q then  the  consumption  smoothing  motive  to maintain
creditworthiness  is  not enough  to sustain  any  borrowing  at all:  The
anticipated  decline  in  output  is  not sufficient  to  provide  an incentive  to
repay  debt  in good times  in order  to  borrow  in  bad times. Otherwise,  however,
a debtor  will  be willing  to  make  a positive  net  resource  transfer  to creditors
when  output  is  high in order  to  borrow  again  when output  is low.
As in the  unconstrained  program,  initially  the  debtor  borrows  in  order  to
raise  current  consumption. At some  point,  however,  debt  reaches  a level  at
which  the  borrower  is indifferent  between  maintaining  access  to the
international  capital  markets  and  defaulting. From that  point  onward,  debt
can  no longer  increase  over time.  Instead,  when output  is low  the  debtor-46-
receives  a  net resource  transfer  from  its  creditors  but  makes  a  net resource
transfer  back  when output  is  high.  In  high output  periods  the  debtor  is
indifferent  between  repaying  and  defaulting,  but in low  output  periods  (when
it  receives  a net resource  transfer  from  creditors)  it is strictly  better  off
than  under  financial  autarky.
Once the  enforcement  constraint  binds,  it  binds  in every  high output
period  thereafter,  and  the  level  of debt  is the  same  in  each subsequent  high
output  period. How large  the  maximum  debt  level  can  be depends  on the  present
value  of the  net resource  transfer  over the  cycle  that  the  debtor  is  prepared
to  make in  order  to avoid  financial  autarky.
Tables  2A and  2B  provide  magnitudes  of indebtedness  and  net transfers  (2A
for  the  case in  which  output  cycles  between  8 and  12,  a 20  per cent  standard
deviation,  and  2B for  the  case in  which  it  cycles  between  9  and 11,  a 10 per
cent  standard  deviation)  for  various  values  of  P  ("beta"),  and  R  - l+r;  CH
and  CL are  consumption  levels  when  output  is  high  and low,  respectively,  while
QH-CH  and  QL-CL  are the  corresponding  net  resource  transfers  from  debtor  to
creditor. (The  first  is  always  positive  and the  second  always  negative.).
The  maximum  amount  of debt  at the  beginning  of a  high output  period  is  given
in the  column  DMAX.
The final  column  cortipares  DMAX  with the  value  of debt incurred  in the
previous  (low-output)  period  times  R.  If the  difference  is  positive  then  the
debtor  in fact  can  borrow  enough  before  the  enforcement  constraint  becomes
binding  to remain  a net  debtor  thereafter.  Otherwise,  the  enforcement
constraint  binds  immediately  and  the  debtor  cannot  initially  borrow  enough  to
remain  a net  debtor  over  the  cycle. Instead,  it can  only  borrow  DMAX/R  when
output  is  low.  The  net transfer  it then  makes  to creditors  when output  is
high  not only fully  repays  debt  but includes,  in  addition,  a net investment  to-47  -
finance  consunption  when  output  is  again  low.
The  tables  reveal  several  relationships:  How  much  debt  can  be sustained
depends  positively  on the  variability  of output  and the  discount  factor,  and
negatively  on the interest  rate. Moreover,  the  effect  of output  variability
is dramatic: An order  of magnitude  more  debt  relative  to average  income  can
be sustained  when  output  fluctuations  are  20 per  cent  rather  than 10  per  cent.
Also  notable  is the  sensitivity  of the  maximum  debt  level  to the interest
rate.
Finally,  note that  increases  in  P  offset  by reductions  in R that  maintain
R. constant  increase  the  maximum  sustainable  debt level. An interpretation  is
that  high frequencv  fluctuations  (say,  over  the  season)  allow  for  more debt  to
be accumulated  than  low  frequency  fluctuations  (say  over the  business  cycle).
The  analysis  is  simple. For  example,  there  are  no allowances  for
uncertainty,  growth,  and investment. Intro 4 -4ng  these  factors  will  not
affect  the  basic  point  of the  exercise,  that  maintaining  access  to  credit
markets  is  a sufficient  reason  to service  debt.
In fact,  domestic  investment  opportunities  provide  an additional  reason
to  want to  maintain  access  to credit  markets. The expected  return  on
investment  opportunities  may  also fluctuate. If  a country  must finance  its
own investment,  taking  advantage  of investment  opportunities  may then  force
consumption  to fluctuate. Access  to international  capital  markets  allo4s  it
to  vary its  investment  level  in  response  to changes  in  domestic  opportunities
without  completely  offsetting  movements  in consumption.
Annual  data on  net resource  transfers  presentLd  in the  Appendix  indicate
that,  during  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  direction  of flow  of funds  between
debtor  countries  and international  capital  markets  changed  on average  ar:-nd  5-48-
times. Possibly,  there  was  much  more  variation  within  the  year.4
4Using  a  model  very  similar  to the  one  developed  here,  Cohen  (1991)
claims  that  avoiding  financial  autarky  cannot,  by itself,  provide  an incentive
to service  debt (p.  94).  What  he actually  shows  is  that  avoiding  financial
autarky  cannot  be the  reason  for  making  net  resource  transfers  two  periods  in
a row.  If it is the  reason  in the  second  period  then,  in  that  period,  the
debtor  must  be indifferent  between  repayment  and  autarky. In the  previous
period,  then,  making  a  net resource  transfer  must  bring  utility  strictly  below
the  autarky  level.TABLE  2A
R=1  +r  beta  CH  CL  QH-CH  QL-CL  DMAX  DMAX-
R*(CL-CL)
1.00i  G.90  10.40  9.37  1.60  -1.37  111.50  110.13
1.005  0.90  10.39  9.39  1.61  -1.39  22.99  21.59
1.010  0.90  10.36  9.42  1.64  -1.42  11.93  10.50
1.020  0.90  10.31  9.47  1.69  -1.47  6.41  4.92
1.030  0.90  10.27  9.52  1.73  -1.52  4.59  3.03
1.040  0.90  10.22  9.56  1.78  -1.56  3.68  2.05
1.050  0.90  10.17  9.61  1.83  -1.61  3.14  1.45
1.060  0.90  10.13  9.66  1.87  -1.66  2.79  1.03
1.070  0.90  10.08  9.71  1.92  -1.71  2.54  0.71
1.080  0.90  10.04  9.76  1.96  -1.76  2.36  0.46
1.090  0.90  9.99  9.80  2.01  -1.80  2.22  0.26
1.100  0.90  9.95  9.85  2.05  -1.85  2.12  0.08
1.001  0.85  10.73  9.1;,  1.27  -1.13  73.05  71.92
1.005  0.85  10.71  9.15  1.29  -1.15  15.15  14.00
.0i0  0.85  10.68  9.17  1.32  -1.17  7.92  6.74
1.020  0.85  10.64  9.22  1.36  -1.22  4.32  3.07
1.030  0.85  10.59  9.27  1.41  -1.27  3.13  1.82
1.040  0.85  10.54  9.32  1.46  -1.32  2.54  1.17
1.050  0.85  10.49  9.37  1.51  -1.37  2.19  0.76
1.060  0.85  10.45  9.41  1.55  -1.41  1.97  0.47
1.070  0.85  10.40  9.46  1.60  -1.46  1.81  0.25
1.080  0.85  10.36  9.51  1.64  -1.51  1.70  0.07
1.090  0.85  10.32  9.56  1.68  -1.56  1.61  -0.09
1.100  0.P5  10.27  9.60  1.73  -1.60  1.55  -0.22
1.110  0.85  10.23  9.65  1.77  -1.65  1.49  -0.34
1.120  0.85  10.19  9.70  1.81  -1.70  1.45  -0.45
1.130  0.85  10.15  9.75  1.85  -1.75  1.42  -0.55
1.140  0.85  10.11  9.79  1.89  -1.79  1.40  -0.64
1.150  0.85  10.07  9.84  1.93  -1.84  1.38  -0.74
1.001  0.95  10.09  9.60  1.91  -1.60  155.24  153.64
1.005  0.95  10.07  9.62  1.93  -1.62  31.88  30.25
1.010  0.95  10.05  9.64  1.95  -1.64  16.47  14.81
1.020  0.95  10.00  9.69  2.00  -1.69  8.77  7.05
1.030  0.95  9.Q5  9.74  2.05  -1.74  6.22  4.43
1.040  0.95  9.91  9.79  2.09  -1.79  4.95  3.09
1.050  0.95  9.86  9.84  2.14  -1.84  4.20  2.27
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R=1 +r  beta  CH  CL  OH-CH  OL-CL  DMAX  DMAX-
R*(CL-OL)
1.001  0.90  10.51  9.47  0.49  -0.47  11.54  11.08
1.005  0.90  10.49  9.49  0.51  -0.49  2.51  2.02
1.010  0.90  10.46  9.51  0.54  -0.51  1.39  0.87
1.020  0.90  10.42  9.56  0.58  -0.56  0.84  0.27
1.030  0.90  10.37  9.61  0.63  -0.61  0.67  0.04
1.040  0.90  10.32  9.66  0.68  -0.66  0.59  -0.10
1.050  0.90  10.27  9.71  0.73  -0.71  0.54  -0.20
1.060  0.90  10.23  9.76  0.77  -0.76  0.52  -0.28
1.070  0.90  10.18  9.81  0.82  -0.81  0.50  -0.36
1.080  0.90  10.14  9.85  0.86  -0.85  0.50  -0.42
1.090  0.90  10.09  9.90  0.91  -0.90  0.50  -0.49
1.100  0.90  10.05  9.95  0.95  -0.95  0.50  -0.55
1.001  0.85  10.80  9.19  0.20  -0.19  1.90  1.71
1.005  0.85  10.78  9.21  0.22  -0.21  0.46  0.25
1.010  0.85  10.76  9.24  0.24  -0.24  0.29  0.05
1.020  0.85  10.71  9.29  0.29  -0.29  0.21  -0.08
1.030  0.85  10.66  9.34  0.34  -0.34  0.20  -0.15
1.040  0.85  10.62  9.38  0.38  -0.38  0.19  -0.21
1.050  0.85  10.57  9.43  0.43  -0.43  0.20  -0.26
1.060  0.85  10.52  9.48  0.48  -0.48  0.20  -0.31
1.070  0.85  10.48  9.53  0.52  -0.53  0.21  . -0.35
1.080  0.85  10.43  9.58  0.57  -0.58  0.22  -0.40
1.09C  0.85  10.39  9.63  0.61  -0.63  0.23  -0.45
1.100  0.85  10.35  9.67  0-65  -0.67  0.24  -0.50
1.110  0.85  10.30  9.72  0.70  -0.72  0.25  -0.55
1.120  0.85  10.26  9.77  0.74  -0.77  0.27  -0.59
1.130  0.85  10.22  9.81  0.78  -0.81  0.28  -0.64
1.140  0.85  10.18  9.86  0.82  -0.86  0.29  -0.69
1.150  0.85  10.14  9.91  0.86  -0.91  0.30  -0.74
1.001  0.95  10.22  9.72  0.78  -0.72  28.18  27.45
1.005  0.95  10.20  9.74  0.80  -0.74  5.96  5.22
1.010  0.95  10.18  9.77  0.82  -0.77  3.19  2.42
1.020  0.95  10.13  9.82  0.87  -0.82  1.82  0.99
1.030  0.95  10.08  9.86  0.92  -0.86  1.37  0.48
1.040  0.95  10.03  9.91  0.97  -0.91  1.15  0.20
1.050  0.95  9.99  9.96  1.01  -0.96  1.03  0.02
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8.  Dealing with Nonpayment
If in fact the sanctions that creditors impose on a debtor in default
take the form of a trade embargo, rather than a seizure of its assets, the
problem arises as to  why the creditor community would ever impose sanctions.
Bulow and Rogoff (1988b) develop an argument which separates private creditor
banks from the rest of the creditor countries.  Default gives banks the legal
right to seize any assets of any debtor in default in the creditor community,
which reduces or eliminates potential gainful trade between the creditor
community as a whole and the debtor country.  Both lose but the banks either
do not suffer or even gain if some trade remains.  The banks' legal rights may
even allow them to extract some transfers from the creditor country public,
who are willing to pay the banks (or give the debtors money to pay the banks)
in order to forestall default and maintain trade with the debtor.
A  remaining question is why t'.e  creditor community protects these
creditor rights if it is not in their interest to do so.  In fact, legal
issues surrounding "state doctrine" suggests that the claims of private
creditors could be quite shaky if exercising them is not in the public
interest.  Alexander (1987) provides a discussion.
The fact that declaring a borrower to be in default may not convey nearly
as much benefit to a creditor in an international context, compared with a
domestic context, makes the disposition of sovereign debts relatively more
difficult to ascertain.  In particular, a creditor way be much more willing to
finance debt-service obligations with "new money" if declaring default does
not convey much in the way of privileges.
Consider the general situation of a creditor confronted with a debtor-50-
that  owes  more than it is  able  or willing  to transfer. There  are  four
options:  (i)  lending  the  difference  (which  could  take  the  form  of
rescheduling,  tolerating  arrears,  or  providing  "new  money");  (ii)  finding
another  creditor  to lend  the  difference; (iii)  forgiving  the  difference; or
(iv)  declaring  the  borrower  in  default  and  seeking  a legal  remedy.
The  following  simple  example,  which  draws  on several  in  the literature,
illustrates  the  situation. A debtor  with current  income  Y  owes  D  now  and  D
next  period. It only  comes  up with  R1 <  D1 this  period,  however. There  are
two  possible  outcomes  in  period  2:  either  the  debtor  has  a high  GDP,  YH, in
which  case  the  debtor  is for  some  reason  willing  to pay  whatever  is  owed,  or
income  is  Y  and  the  debtor  repays  R2 <  D2. (Why  the  debtor  is  willing  to  pay
more  when income  is  high than  when it  is low  is not  modeled.) The  probability
n(e) that  income  is  high depends  positively  on the  debtor's  effort  e in  period
1,  which  could,  for  example,  reflect  its  investment  in exportable  commodities,
fiscal  reform,  etc.  Effort  reduces  current  income.
In  period  1, then,  the  debtor  chooses  e to maximize:
Y  - R-  e +  r(e)(YH-RH)  +  [l-w(e)](YL  -RL)
where  RH is  whatever  is owed  in  period  2.
A unit of effort  costs  the  debtor  1 now  and  provides  it  an expected
return  ff'(e)(YH-R2_YL  +RL),  where  ff'(e)  is the  increase  in the  probability  of
high  income  from  an extra  unit of effort. The  amount  of effort  that  the
debtor  will  want to undertake  to increase  the  probability  of high income  is
thus  a positive  function  of the  difference  between  income  after  repayment  in
the  two  periods. Hence  we can  write  the  equilibrium  amount  of effort  as
e(YH-R  -YL  +RL). Most significantly,  the  amount  of effort  that the  debtor  will 2  2-51-
want to  expend  falls  as R  rises.
Formal  Bankruptcy  and Legal Remedies
Consider  now the  various  options  available  to the  creditor,  beginning
with (iv)  a formal  declaration  of  default  and  subsequent  legal  remedy. It is
not  entirely  clear,  in the  context  of sovereign  debt,  what this  would  mean.
But  one interpretation  of this  course  of  action  is that  it allows  the  creditor
to  take  some  of the  debtor's  current  assets  within  territory  subject  to the
jurisdiction  of the  creditor's  legal  system. Once  the  disposition  of these
assets  was  adjudicated,  however,  any  remaining  claim  that  the  creditor  has
against  the  sovereign  would  be wiped  clean. 6
Say  that  this  course  of action  yields  the  creditor  an expected  net gain  G
and the  creditor  an expected  direct  loss  L.  Since  the  period  2  debt is
canceled  the  debtor  would  then  find  it  worthwhile  to  expend  an amount
e(YHYL ).  This is the  socially  efficient  amount,  since  the  debtor  recovers
all the  gains  from  its  effort. All distortion  imposed  by the  debt  itself  is
eliminated. To the  extent  that  L exceeds  G, however,  bankruptcy  itself
introduces  inefficiency;  and there  are  reasons  to think  that  the
inefficiencies  associated  with sovereign  bankruptcy  are  significant,  although
we have little  direct  evidence.
New  Money
Consider  as the  next  option  (i):  lending  the  difference. The  creditor
6lt is  not the  case,  as is occasionally  claimed,  that  by setting  aside  a
loan  loss  reserve  or "writing  down"  a debt  a creditor  cancels  it.  Taking
these  actions  does  not  relinquish  any  legal  rights.-52-
gets  R1 now and increases  its  period  2 debt  by (D1-R 1)(l+r  ),  where  rL is the
interest  rate  on  what is  rolled  over.  But  this  amount  is  paid  if and if
Y - YH.  The debtor's  period  2 obligation  grows  to D2+(D -R )(l+r  ),  so that
its  optimal  level  of effort  falls  to e[YH-D  +(D -R )(l+rL)-Y  +RL.  The 2  1-R1)(+)Y+ 2].Th
creditor  can expect  to get  R +w(e)[D 2+(D -R  )(l+rL)]  +  [l-ir(e)]R  L since  the
creditor  pays  R1 now for  sure  and  D2+(D  -R )(l+r  )  the  next  period  with
probability  w(e[YH-D 2+(D  -R  )(l+r  )-YL+R 2]) and  RLwith  remaining  probability.
Here  the  debt  burden  is at its  maximum,  but if income  is  high the  creditor
recovers  the  most.
Forgiveness
Turn  now to option  (iii),  forgiving  the  current  shortfall. Again  the
creditor  receives  R  for  sure  now,  but receives  D2, the  original  obligation,
next  period  with  probability  lr[e(YH-D L  YRL)].  Hence  the  period  2 debt 2  + 2)I  ec  h  eid2db
obligation  and the  consequent  amount  of effort  on the  part of the  debtor  to
achieve  a high income  are  somewhere  in  between  what they  are in the  case  of a
rollover  and  a cancellation.6
In comparing  options  (i)  and (iii),  the  creditor  trades  off the  size  of
the  period  2 obligation  wich  the  likelihood  that  the  obligation  will  be paid
off. The  higher  the  debt  obligation,  the  less  effort  the  debtor  is likely  to
put into  ensuring  that  circumstances  will  be such  that  it  will  pay.
L 6Note,  by the  way, that  formally,  through  the  choice  of r ,  financing  a
postponement  of repayment  includes  debt  forgiveness  (r  - -100%)  and
cancellation  (r  -D 2/(D  -R  )xlOO%)  as special  cases. We are thinking,
however,  of rollovers  as occurring  at either  the  actuarially  fair  rate  or at
least  at the  risk-free  rate.  A rollover  at anything  less  than  the  actuarially
fair  rate  involves  an element  of forgiveness.-53-
The  "Debt  Laffer  Curve"  and  Debt  Relief
The general  situation,  illustrated  by this  example,  in  which  an increase
in a debtor's  debt  can  actually  lower  its  expected  net  resource  transfers  to
its  creditors  (and  hence,  presumably,  the  market  value  of its  debt)  has  been
called  a "debt  Laffer  curve." Obviously,  zero  obligations  imply  zero
transfers  and  have  zero  value,  so the  relationship  between  the  face  value  and
market  value  of the  debt  must  be nondecreasing  over  a range. But  at some
point,  the  aigument  goes,  the  disincentive  effects  associated  with  a high
nominal  debt  burden  create  such  a disincentive  to  bring  about  conditions  for
full  repayment  that  more nominal  debt  means  less,  on average,  will  be repaid.
The  phenomenon  has implications  for  issues  other  than  what creditors
should  do about  unpaid  debt.  If,  for  example,  adding  to the  future  debt
burden  reduces  the  value  of the  debt,  then  it is  quite  likely  that  subtracting
from  it  will increase  the  value  of the  debt.  Regardless  of  what the  debtor
pays in  period  1, creditors  may find  it in their  collective  interest  to reduce
period  2 debt service  obligations  below  D2, say  to  D2, in  order  to raise  e
and, therefore, w.
Note that  the  possibility  of a  debt  Laffer  curve  in this  example  requires
that  there  be at least  two  possible  outcomes  that  bear the  following
relationship  to each  other. In one  state  the  debtor  pays less  than  what it
owes,  and  what it  does  pay in  that  state  does  not increase  unit for  unit  with
what it  owes.  In another  state  the  debtor  pays  more,  and  what it does  pay
strictly  increases  with  what it owes,  and the  marginal  effect  of  what it owes
on what it  pays in this  state  is greater  than  the  effect  on  what it pays in
the  state  in  which  it  pays less.-54-
More generally,  say  that  in the  low  income  state  the  debtor  pays  RL(D 2)
H~~~~~~~~~~~~~
while  in the  high income  sitate  it  pays  R (D 2).  Effort  as a function  of D2 is
then e[Y  - Y  +  R (D 2)  - R (D 2)].  For an increase in debt to decrease e
L  H
requires  that  R  L(D 2) rise  by strictly  less than  R  H(D 2) when  D  rises. 2  2  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
What the  creditor  can  expect  to get in  period  2 is:
ir(e)RH(D 2) +  [1-fr(e)]R  (D 2),
so that  for  an increase  in  e to raise  the  expected  payment  requires  that
RH(D 2) > R (D 2).
These  conditions  were all  satisfied  in our  example  since  R  H(D  D  and
L  L R (D)2  R2. They  would  not  be satisfied  if,  for  example,  the  debtor  was
expected  to  pay the  same  amount  regardless  of income  (if  R (D 2) - RL(D 2) - D2)
or if  whatever  it  was  expected  to  repay  in  either  state  was independent  of D2.
The typical  assumption  is  as in the  example,  that  nominal  debt affects  what a
debtor  repays  only  when it  repays  the full  amount. In  that  case the
possibility  of a debt  Laffer  curve  requires  a belief  that  there  is  a
significant  likelihood  that  the  full  amount  of the  debt  will be paid  off.
Otherwise,  the  face  value  of the  debt  is irrelevant.
Coordination, Free Riders, and New Lenders
A natural  question  raised  by the  debt  Laffer  curve  is  why, if reducing
the  face  value  of a country's  debt  raises  its  actual  value,  don't  lenders  take
advantage  of the  relationship  by forgiving  debt,  to the  point  at  which its
market  value  is  maximized.
One  explanation  is that  reducing  the  face  value  requires  coordination-55-
among  lenders,  each  of whom  benefits  from  debt relief  by others. The
explanation  is incomplete,  however. It  would  still  pay for  a single  purchaser
to buy  up all (or  at least  a major  portion)  of the  outstanding  debt,  and then
reduce  the  debt.  The initial  holders  might  appropriate  much  of the  gain,  but
an offer  contingent  on 100  per  cent  participation  would  still  leave  a reward
to anyone  trying  to consolidate  the  debt  and  achieve  the  gain.
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Diwan  (1990)  have suggested  deposit  insurance  as a
reason  for  the  market's  failure  to consolidate  debt  and  achieve  potential
efficiency  gains. They  distinguish  between  sound  and  unsound  banks. Unsound
banks  may  actually  prefer  to  hold  an assel:  with  a more  variable  return  even if
its  expected  return  is lower. The reason  is that  if the  return  is low  or even
average  the  bank  will fail,  and  bank  owners  will  not  suffer  the  entire  loss,
but a  high return  will ensure  survival,  so that  the  owners  will  enjoy  the
gain.  Hence  unsound  banks  may actually  consider  the  debt  to  be more  valuable
if it is  not  written  down (since  there  is some  chance  of a  high return)  and
may  not  be willing  to sell  the  debt at its  market  value  to a sound  bank.  One
might  ask, then,  why  unsound  banks  don't  buy all  the  debt.  The answer  is  that
they  lack  the  funds  to do so by virtue  of their  unsoundness.
Proponents  of a  public  buyout  of the  debt,  for instance  Kenen (1990)  and
Sachs (1990),  have also  made  use of the  debt  Laffer  curve  argument. The idea
is that,  since  market  failures  have rendered  the  private  markets  incapable  of
writing-down  the  debt,  a public  institution  should  correct  the  failure  by
buying  up the  debt  and realizing  the  Laffer  curve  gain  itself.
Obviously,  the  soundness  of such  an institution  hinges  on the  position  of
the  relevant  debtors  on the  debt  Laffer  curve.  If  debtors  are  on the  "wrong"
(downward-sloping)  side  of the  curve  then  the institution  could  make  money,  or
at least  avoid  a loss,  by realizing  the  gains  from  debt  relief. If debtors-56-
are  on the  upward-sloping  portion,  however,  no such  efficiency  gains  exist,
and  if it  buys the  debt  at anything  above  market  value  it  will lose,  unless,
of course,  it  has  some  advantage  over  private  creditors  in  collecting  payment.
There  is little  reason  to see  why it should. Existing  public  institutions  do
not  seem to  have  succeeded  in achieving  net  resource  transfers  from  their
debtors  to the  extent  that  private  creditors  have.  More  evidence  on this
question,  however,  would  be enlightening.
Public  involvement  in the  debt  crisis  may,  however,  provide  sovereign
debtors  an option  that  is rarely  available  domestically.  Consider  the
remaining  response  to a recalcitrant  debtor,  option  (ii),  finding  another
lender  to lend  the  difference  between  what the  debtor  owes and  what it is
willing  to  pay.  It is  rarely  the  case  that  a loan  will  be worth  more to
another  private  lender  than it is to the  original  lender. Nevertheless,
public  desire  to  avoid  financial  disruption  and  possible  inefficiencies
associated  with default  has  created  pressure  for  a public  takeover  of the
debt: Already,  on an ad hoc  basis,  official  lending  agencies  have lent
problem  debtors  some  of the  difference  between  what they  owe  and  what they
want to  pay their  private  creditors. Various  proposals  for  debt relief
institutionalize  this  response.-57-
9.  Buybacks  and  Swaps: Market-Based  Debt  Reduction  Schemes
Various  schemes  have  been  proposed,  some  of which  have  been implemented,
in  which  debtor  countries  buy  back their  debt  on the  secondary  market. The
original  loan  covenants  typically  prohibit  debtor  buybacks. Hence  overt
buybacks  require  that  creditors  waive  these  prohibitions.  Debtor  governments
may nevertheless  be able to  buyback  covertly,  through  third  parties,  for
example. In fact,  creditors  have  now  permitted  debtor  buybacks  in  a number  of
circumstances.
Buybacks  have taken  several  forms;
1.  Simple  buybacks  using  the  debtor's  own resources.
2.  Simple  buybacks  using  donated  resources.
3.  "Swap"  arrangements,  whereby  the  government  exchanges  debt for
domestic  currency  at some  stated  price. The  use  of this  currency  is tied  to
particular  purposes  such  as direct  foreign  investment  (in  the  case  of
debt-equity  swaps)  or environmental  protection  (debt-for-nature  swaps).
Swaps  can  be decomposed  into  a simple  buyback  with a subsidy  to direct
foreign  investment  (in  the  case  of debt-equity  swaps)  or to  environmental
protection  (in  the  case  of debt-for-nature  swaps). The  amount  of the  subsidy
depends  upon the  price  at which  debt is  repurchased  and  on the  exchange  rate
offered.
Discussion  has focused  on the  buyback  component  of the  scheme,  which  can
be analyzed  in isolation  from  the  swap  component. A particular  controversy
surrounds  the  extent  to  which  buybacks  benefit  debtors. One  claim  is that
they  benefit  creditors  at the  expense  of debtors. Another  is that  they
benefit  both.  I  present,  in  very simple  form,  examples  in  which  each  result-58-
emerges,  and  discuss  the  assumptions  driving  the  different  outcomes.
9.1  "Average"  and  "Marginal"  Debt: Are  Buybacks  Boons  or  Boondoggles?
Bulow  and  Rogoff  J988a) argue  that,  in  the  case  of sovereign  debt,
buybacks  out  of the  debtor's  own  resources  benefit  creditors  at the  expense  of
debtors,  and  that  creditors  appropriate  the  lion's  share  of funds  donated  to  a
debtor  to  buy  back debt.
Consider  a two-period  case  in  which  the  debtor  owes  an amount  D in  period
2.  How  much it  will  pay to service  any  level  of debt in  period  2 is  an amount
R that  has a  probability  distribution  F(R),  which,  critically,  is independent
of D.  What it actually  will  pay is the  minimum  of R and  D, so if  R exceeds  D
i.  pay-  4 -ts  debt in full,  while  otherwise  it  pays  R atAd  defaults  on the  rest.
(For  simplicity,  all  magnitudes  are  discounted  to  period  1  prese.:t  values.)
Creditors  know  all this,  so they  anticipate  an expected  payment  V(D) that
is a function  of the  face  value  of the  debt  D:
D
V(D;  RdF(R) + [1-F(D)]D.
0
The  first  term  reflects  what creditors  get  when  R is less  than  D, the  realized
value  of  R.  The second  term  is the  probability  that  R exceeds  D times
repayment  in that case,  D.  Since  V(') is  the  expected  amount  of repayment  in
period  2, if the  market  is  risk-neutral  then  V(D) should  equal  the  period  1
market  value  of the  debt.
The  marginal  value  of debt  is the  effect  of an increase  in  one  unit  of
its  face  value  on its  market  value. Differentiating  with respect  to D, the-59-
marginal  value is:
D
V'(D)  - l-F(D)  +  d(J  RdF(R))/dD
Since  the  distribution  of  R is  assumed  to  be independent  of D, this
expression  reduces  to 1-F(D),  the  probability  of full  repayment. In this  case
the  only  effect  of increasing  nominal  debt  by one  unit is to increase
repayment  by one  unit if full  repayment  is  made.  Otherwise  it  has  no effect.
The average  value  of a unit  of debt  p will  equal  V(D)/D  or:
D
p  - J (R/D)dF(R)  +  1-F(D).
0
This amount  corresponds  to  expected  payment  per  unit  of debt.  It exceeds
1  - F(D)  as long  as some  payment  occurs  even if full  repayment  is  not  made,
but the  price  cannot  exceed  one.
When the  debtor  buys  up its  own  debt,  the  presumption  is that it  should
pay at least  the  average  price  p, since  this is the  value  of the  claim  that
the  seller  is sacrificing. In fact,  buybacks  have occurred  at prices  near or
above  the  market  price.
7 To give  buybacks  the  best chance  of  helping  the
debtor,  I treat  the  case in  which  buybacks  take  place  at the  market  price.
The effect  of the  buyback  on what  the  debtor  pays subsequently  is the
marginal  value  V'(D)  minus  the  extent  to  which  resources  used for  the  current
buyback  (p)  reduce  what  will  be available  for  repayment  subsequently.  Say
that  every  dollar  spent  on  buybacks  reduces  funds  available  for  repayment  by a
70ne  finding  is that  debt  bought  back through  negotiations  with  creditors
costs  much  more than  the  market  price,  while  auctions  lead to  prices  close  to
the  market  value.-60-
fraction  A.  If one  unit  of debt  is  bought  back at price  p then  what the
debtor  is  willing  to  pay for  any  level  of debt  falls  from  R to  R - Ap.
How a  buyback  of one init  of debt  affects  what the  debtor  ultimately
transfers  to the  creditor  thus  has three  components. First,  there  is the
transfer  entailed  in the  buyback  itself,  equal  to to the  average  price
p - V(D)/D. Then there  is the  consequent  change  in the  face  value,  which
reduces  expected  repayment  by the  marginal  value  of the  debt  V'(D)  - 1 - F(D).
Finally,  there  is the  expected  reduction  in  what the  debtor  will  pay  when
there  is incomplete  payment,  which  equals  AF(D)p,  the  probability  of
incomplete  payment  F(D)  times  what is  spent  on the  buyback  p times  the  effect
of  buybacks  on resources  available  for  repayment  A.  The  total  effect,  then
is:
V(D)  V'(D) - ApF(D) - p - 1  +  F(D)(l-Xp).
D
Since  1 2  p  >  1 - F(D),  this  amount  is  positive  if A  0, as Bulow  and
Rogoff  (1988a)  claim  is the  case  for  sovereign  debt,  and  negative  if A  - 1,
which  they  consider  to  be the  case for  corporate  debt.
Hence  a crucial  issue  is  how  much the  buyback  reduces  what is  available
for  later  repayment. If future  resources  are  significantly  reduced,  (A  near
one) then  the  buyback  is a  boon for  the  debtor. A unit  of debt  reduction
costs  p.  But it reduces  its  net resource  transfer  by nearly  p if it fails  to
repay  fully  and  by 1  >  p if it  does repay  fully.
But if the  resources  used to  buy  debt  does  not affect  what creditors  can
later  hope to collect  (as  might  be the  case  when funds  were  donated  for  that
purpose)  then  spending  p now  only  reduces  payments  (by  1) if full  repayment  is
made,  which  occurs  with  probability  1-F(D),  but not  at all  otherwise. Since  p-61-
exceeds  the  probability  of full  repayment,  the  debtor  loses. The scheme  is  a
"boondoggle"  for  the  creditor.
An empirical  issue  is the  effect  that  buybacks  have  had on the  value  of
remaining  debc.  The  value  of A determines  how the  price  of remaining  debt
responds  to the  buyback. Differentiating  the  expression  for  p - V(D)/D  at B,
the  amount  of debt  bought  back,  and evaluating  at B - 0 gives:
d-  [p - 1  +  (1-A)F(D)]/D. dB
Hence,  under  Bulow-Rogoff  presumption  that  the  buyback  does  not affect
resources  available  for  repayment  (A  - 0) the  price  of remaining  debt  rises
after  a  buyback  (since  p 2 1 - F(D)).  In the  limiting  case in  which  there  is
no possibility  of all debt  being  paid off (F(D)  - 1) then  dp/p  - E/D  - -dD/D;
so that  pD is  unchanged. The  value  of remaining  debt  outstanding  is
unaffected  by the  buyback  since  it  has  no effect  on what the  creditors  expect
to receive  subsequently.
On the  other  hand,  if  resources  used  for  a  buyback  decrease  what is
available  for  repayment  unit for  unit (A  - 1) then  the  price  of remaining  debt
falls  after  a  buyback. Only in  the  limiting  case in  which  repayment  is
assured,  so that  p - 1, is there  no effect.
9.2  Buybacks  as a Cure  for  Debt  Hangovers
So far,  this  analysis  assumes  that  there  is  no excess  burden  associated
with  debt,  so that  the  only  question  arising  from  the  buyback  is  how it
affects  the  net resource  transfer  from  debtor  to creditor. Since  total
resources  are  given  there  is  no potential  for  a nec  gain to  both  parties.-62-
In  f%ct,  one  argument  in  favor  of buybacks  is their  rotential  to
eliminate  inefficiencies  associated  with  the  debt  overhang. 8 A  very stark
example  that  illustrates  how  they  could  builds  on the  public  finance
constraint  introduced  in section  6.
Say  that  a government  initially  owes  an amount  D in a future  period. It
can  raise  an amount  T  < D  by taxing  rescurces  in inelastic  supply  (like  land)
but  must raise  the  rest  by taxing  the  return  to capital  investment  projects.
These  projects  yield  F(K)  before  tax,  where  K is the  amount  invested.
F(O)  - 0,  and F is increasing,  but at  a diminishing  rate.  If  K is  positive
then the  tax  rate t is  set so that  D - T0 + tF(K). The  after-tax  return  on
domestic  investment  r  H(K) is thus:
r (K) - F'(K)(l-t) - F'(K)[l+(T  -D)/F(K)].
At K - 0 the  marginal  return  to investment  is negative  infinity,  since  all the
proceeds  of any investment  will  be taxed  to try  to  pay the  debt.  Hence,  as
long  as there  is  a foreigr.  investment  opportunity  (earning  r ),  then  no
investment  (capital  flight)  is  an equilibrium. There  may  also  be another
equilibrium  with investment  sufficient  to repay  the  debt  and  provide  a
competitive  return. Say  that  this investment  amount  is  K*.  In  the flight
equilibrium  only  T0 is repaid,  while  in the  second,  all  is repaid.
Say that  the  expectation  is that  K* will  be invested  with  probability  i.
Then the  value  of the  debt  i3  V(D)  - (l-ff)T 0 + irD,  and  the  price
p(D) - (l-ff)T 0/D + ff.
Consider  now  a buyback  of an amount  B of nominal  debt.  If the
probability  of capital  flight  remains  l-w  as long  as the  possibility  remains
tSee,  for  example,  Krugman  (1989)  and  Helpman  (1990).-63-
then  buying  back an amount  B < D - T  will  occur  at a price  i  +  (l-w)TO/D.
Debt service  will  be reduced  by B  with  probability  Xr  and  by -ApB  with
probability  1-Xf.  The  net effect  on net  resource  transfers  to  creditors  is:
(l-,r)B(T 0B/D  -[x+(l-s)T0B/D]1,
which,  as  before,  is  positive  if  A - 0 but  negative  if  A - 1.
Consider,  however,  a  buyback  B  >  D-To  if A - 0.  Such  a  buyback  ensures
that  nondistortionary  taxes  suffice  to repay  the  remaining  debt the  next
period. The  possibility  of a tax  on investment  is eliminated.  Hence  the
probability  of repayment  is raised  to one.
If creditors  realize  the  extent  of the  buyback,  the  price  of debt  will
rise  to  one, so  debt  must  be bought  at  par.  The  debtor  must spend  B  now and
D-B  the  next  period  on debt.  Hence  the  buyback  makes  full  repayment  certain.
But  the  debtor's  expected  income  over the  two  periods  rises  from  w[F(K*)-D]  +
(l-w)[r  K*-TO]  to F(K*)-D,  which is  an increase  as long  as F(K*)-r  K*  2 D-To,
or as long  as the  difference  between  national  incomes  in  the  no-fliglht  and
flight  cases  exceeds  the  difference  in  debt  repayment  between  those  two  casjs.
The  buyback  benefits  both  parties  in this  example  by eliminating  possible
distortions  due  to  delay.  Since  capital  is inelastically  supplied  in the
short  run  but  elastically  supplied  in the  long  run, fvture  taxes  to finance
repayment  provide  more  scope  for  distortion  than  curren.  taxes. Hence  a
buyback,  by moving  more  of the  repayment  up front,  may  require  less
distortionary  taxation  than  the  original  repayment  schedule.
Note,  however,  that  if this  argument  has  merit  then  the  frequert  claim
that  lengthnening  maturities  will alleviate  debt  problems  is invalid. On the
contrary,  to impose  the  minimum  excess  burden,  repayment  is to  be gotten  over-64-
with quickly.  Delay just increases the potential distortions imposed by
raising the revenue needed to repay.
Buybacks  and  the  Laffer  Curve
Note that the buyback may benefit both parties even though the situation
is nct characterized by a "debt Laffer curve," contrary to claims that appear
in the literature.  Forgiving any amount of debt B less than D-T0 will cause
expected repayment to fall by nB, while forgiving an amount in excess of D-T
will cause expected repayment fall from iD - (1-n)T 0 to below TO'  In neither
case does debt forgiveness increase the value of the debt.
In conclusion, a debt buyback can benefit a debtor.  This requires,
however, either that funds used to buy back debt reduce what is available
subsequently for repayment (in  which case the buyback is necessarily at the
expense of the creditor) or that it reduce or eliminate a distortion
associated with a debt overhang (in  which case the buyback can benefit the
creditor as well).-65-
10.  Conclusion
Clearly, the issue of sovereign debt raises a large number of complex
issues that have yet to be fully worked out.  A reason that much work remains
to be done is that most economic thinking has posited that contracts are
automatically enforceable.  But lack of enforceability is key to the sovereign
debt problem.  Morecver, sovereign debt raises issues that are intrinsically
political as well as more traditionally economic.  For sovereign debt to be
amenable to economic analysis, our tool kits must be enlarged to allow for an
analvsis of political outcomes.
Limitations of space and time have forced me to ignore a number of
important issues that have received attention.  Examples are the literature on
bargaining between debtors and creditors (for example, Bulow and Rogoff
(1989a)  and Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990)),  work on nontraded goods and the
real exchange rate (see, e.g., Glick and Kharas (1984),  Alexander (1987)), and
the implications of land values and monopoly rents for foreign indebtedness
(see, e.g., Eaton (1988,1989b)).
While much theoretical and empirical work remains to be done, it is clear
from the experience of the last decade that international capital markets have
not functioned smoothly:  There is lictle reason to think that current
institutional arrangements can achieve an outcome in which the marginal
productivity of capital is the same everywhere.  What capital movements have
occurred have led to financial crisis, political conflict and government
bailouts.  An outstanding research issue is h-  to motivate international
financial institutions to do a better job.-66.
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World  Bank (1990),  World  Debt  Tables.FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976
1  + 3 MONTH  T-BILL  RATE
1.0668  1.0646  1.0435  1.0407  1.0704  1.0789  1.CS84  1.0499
CUM )ISC RATE  1.0668  1.1357  1.1850  1.2333  1.3201  1.4242  1.5074
(Up tD prevous  year)
008 Argentina
030 Disbursements  -Commercal Banks  52,800.000  125.200,000  176,500,000  310,200,000  342,300,000  67.300,000  1,248,000.000
038 Pr,inpal  RpayrMents  - Commercl  Barns  69.000,000  55.600,000  16,800,000  55.600,000  171,000,000  162.500.000  187,700,000
046 nterest  Payments  - Commercia Banks  8.700,000  11.200,000  16,600,000  35.900.000  71.200,000  78.900.000  74,000,00D
Urdiscoun_ed  Accurrniated  Flow  (24.900,000)  58,400,000  143,100,000  218.700.000  107.100,000  (174.100.000)  986,300,000
Discouned  Accumaed  Flow  (23,341,4699  51,423,751  120,755,357  177,331,476  81,129,802  (1lZ243,176)  654,324,622
020 Boivi
030 Disbursemetts  - Commercial  Banks  0  11,300.000  21,400.000  4,800.000  54.300,000  73.000.000  166,700.000
038 Pnncipal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  1.000.000  3,400,000  10,100,000  3,.00,000  6,100.000  5.700.000  16.200,001
046 Interest  Payms  -Commercial Banks  100,000  1,100,000  1,400,000  2.400.000  3,000.000  8.900.000  17,100,000
Undiscounted  Accumulatee  Flow  (1,100,000)  6.800,000  9,900.000  (1,400.000)  45.20.D000  58,400,000  133,399,999
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (1,031,150)  5,987,697  8,354.144  (1.135.181)  34.239.655  41,005.178  88.499.345
022 Brazil
030 Dsbursements  - Commercial  Banks  333,100,000  506,300,000  938,499,968  1,272,300,032  2,280,999,56  Z,85.100.032  2,907,200.00
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commiercial  Banks  137,000,000  171,500.000  195,400,000  234.700.000  232100,000;  396.400,000  424.500.000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  45,100.000  56.100,000  79,600,000  168.500.000  328.000.000  534,000.000  582.700.032
Undscounted Accumulated  Flow  151,000,000  278.700.000  663,499,968  869.100.032  1,720,899.936  1,654.700,032  1,899,999,968
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  141,548,787  245,407.523  559.896,406  ?04,704,122  1.303.606,641  1.161.836.804  1,260,485,411
035 Chile
030 ODsbursements  - Commercial  Banks  118,700,000  59,600.0DO  77,100,000  61.400,000  103,900,000  81.800,000  136,900,000
038 Pnncrpal  Repayrments  - Commercial  Banks  31,700,000  24.500,000  11,100.000  14.300.000  42,200.000  53.500,000  115,600,000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  19.200,000  16,100.000  2.500,000  8.400.000  19.800,000  29,500.000  33,700,000
Undisc.,uned  Accumulated  Flow  67,800,000  19,000,000  63,500,000  38,700,000  41,900,000  (1.t.000)  (12.400.000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  63,556,343  16,730,330  53,584,662  31,379.644  31,739,857  (842.572)  (8.226.326)
038 Colombia
030 Disburseernts - Conmcial  Banks  8,200,000  25,000.000  103,200.000  91,700,000  139.700,000  127.200.000  19,000,000
038 Prncipal Repayments-  Commercial  Banks  12,300,000  10,700,000  9,100.C00  30,500,000  91.100,000  9,600,000  12.300,000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  2,300,000  1,500,000  2,100.000  8,300,000  14,800,000  23,400,0£0  25.600,000
Undiscourted  Accumatda  Flow  (6,400,000)  1Z800,000  9o0.00000  52,900,000  33.800.000  94,200,000  (18.900,000)
Oiscotmed Accumulated  Flow  (5.999.419)  11,270,959  77.634,472  42,893,622  25.603.990  66,141,914  (12538,513)
Sotcer  Wodd  B9*.  IAudd  Delt  Tables:  1991990FLOWS  FROM  PFRVATE  CREDITORS
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  . 1963
3  tM  ONTH  T.BILL  RATE
1.0527  1.0722  1.1004  1.1151  1.1403  1.1069  1.0863
CUM  DISC  RATE  1.5826  1.6659  1.7862  1.9655  2-1917  Z4991  2.762
(u,p  tepsbou  ea
Argenia




038 Prinpl  Repaymrerns  - Commercial  Banks  27Z300.000  1.118.30D.032  299s,a8,000  481.000,000  555.400,000  503,3D0.000  458,900,000
046 Interest  Payrmens  - Commercia Baks  123.400.000  240.300.000  245,500,000  503,600.000  706.400,000  967,299,968  1,09,699,9D4
Undiscounted  Accmnulated  Flow  189.200.032  155.399,968  1.754.20,032  ,118.78799808  (126.299.968)  p31.399,968)  111,900,128
Discoufned  Accumulated  Flow  119.553.319  93.284,043  982.099,968  604,826,457  (57.627.139)  (332.673.728)  40.452,595
020 Bolivia
030 Disbursements  - Conwercial Banks  242s800.000  329.600.000  125.90.000  99,000.000  27.500.000  42500.000  13.900.000
038 Pnncipal  Repayments-  Commercial  Bankb  38.500.000  207.800.000  65,699.996  55,300.0o0  37_200.000  23.300.000  165w0.000
046 Interest  Payments  -ComffmW  Banks  30.200,000  48.900,000  77.400.000  104,500,000  92.800,000  79.300.000  86.000,000
Undscoumted  Accumulated  Flow  174.100.000  72,900,000  (17.199.996)  (60.800.000)  (102.500.000)  (60.100,ODO)  (88.600.O00)
Dicounted Accumulated  Flw  110,011.783  43.760.670  (9.629.526)  (30933.256)  (46.767.80)  (24.048s2  (329,454)
022 Brazil
03O  Disbursents-  Commeral  Banks  3,118.200,064  6,481t999,872  6.513.900,032  4.89,0700.288  7,504.50.224  7.099.700,224  4.356.700.160
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  B3 ks  835.600.000  1.565.699,968  2.230.200.064  Z427.800,064  Z297.999.872.  1.957.400,064  512w,8000
046 Interest  Payrmnts  - Commercial  Bans  697,200.000  1,157,200,000  2.023.100.032  3.121,899.776  4.033,499,904  4.761.700,352  3.991,600.128
Undicounted Accumulated  Flo  1,585.400,064  3.759,099,904  2.260.599.936  (658.999.552)  1,173,000.448  380.599,808  (147.699.968)
D&scounted  Accumulated  Flw  1.001.796.020  2,256525,802  1.265.611.153  (335,279.634)  535,207,259  12291,992  (53.394.461)
035 Chile
030 Dsbursements  - Conmmrcial  Banks  510.700,000  1.159.300.096  1,102.00D.000  600.900.032  902.400,000  1.145,300.096  1.330.599.936
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Batks  129.100,00a  421,900,000  415.500.000  466,100.000  847.299,968  202.100,000  74.300.000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commeral  Banks  45.400,00  141.300,000  216,700.000  332.600.000  363.900,000  437.000,000  424,700,000
Undrscomned  Anccmulated  Flow  336,199.992  596.100.096  469,s80,000  (197,799,968)  (308,799.968)  56,20O,096  831,599,936
Discounted  Accumualaed  Flow  212,440,898  357,823.076  263,020,497  (100.634.819)  (140.896,779)  202.549.290  300.628,573
038 Colombia
030 Dibursements - Conmmrcia  Banks  163,200.000  41.800,000  675.200.000  500.400,000  796,200,000  531,599.968  419-.0,a000
038 Princia  epaymet  -Commrercia  Banks  28.500.000  52,600,000  229.000.000  51.500.000  57,800.000  57.700.000  83,300.000
046 Interest  Payments  * Conmrwcial  Banks  25,400.000  41.000,000  79,500.OW  127.500,0o0  239.500,000  372,700,000  276300.000
Undiscounted  Accumuatred  Flow  109.300,000  (51.80,000)  366,700.000  321,400,000  498.300,000  101.199.968  59,600,000
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  69,065,410  (31.094,68?)  205,299.311  163.518.889  227.634,100  40,493.832  21.545.M
Source: Wortd  Bnk  World Ode Tables: 1s9891990FLCWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
1  + 3 MONTH T-BILL  RATE
1.0958  1.0748  1.0598  1.0582  1.0669
CUM DISC RATE  3.0049  3.2928  3.5391  3.7507  3.9690
(up to previous  yea,)  #  of sign revesals
PV of net flow
008  Argentina
030 Disbursements  - Commecial  Banks  223,300,000  29965399,840  1,514,000,000  1.790,499.968  664,600,000
038 Principal Repayments - Commercial Banks  84.700,000  430.900,000  716,299,968  245,000,000  0
04  Interest Payments - Commercial Banks  1.797.600,000  3,072.100,096  2,582.300,160  2.767.100,160  1,725,500.032
Undiscounted Accumulated Flow  (1.659.000,000)  (506.100,256)  (1.784,600,128)  (1.221,600,192)  (1.060,900,032)  6
Discounted Accumulated Flow  (552.093.221)  (153.699,088)  (504,252,424)  (325,695,870)  (267,294,403)  $586,260,852
020  Bolivia
030 ODsbursements  - Commercial Banks  13,600,000  4,800.000  0  25,000,000  0
038 Principal Repayments - Commercial Banks  11.300,000  9,300,000  6.800,000  6,000,000  29,200.000
046 Interest Payments  - Commtercial Banks  28.700,000  3,400,000  2,100,000  1.800.000  3.000.000
Undiscounted Accumulated Flow  (26,400,000)  (7.900.000)  (8,900.000)  17,200,000  (32,200.000)  6
Discounted Accumulated Flow  (8.785,570)  (2.399.174)  (2,514,763)  4,585.763  (8.112809)  $169,057,249
022  Brazil
030 Oisbursements - Commercial Banks  6,939,799,552  295,800.000  221,300,000  45.900.000  2,916,000,000
038 Principal Repayments - Commercial Banks  378.700,000  66,600,000  37.100,000  166.300,000  200.00o
046 Interest Payinents - Commercial Banks  3.890.300.160  4.276.299.776  3.359.899,904  3,141.499.904  8,035,200,000
Undracounted  Accumulated Flow  2.670.799.392  (4.047.099.776)  (3.175.699,904)  (3,261.899,904)  (5.119,400.000)  5
Discounted Accumulated Flow  888,806.655  (1,229,075.734)  (897.318.312)  (869.668.600)  (1,289.835.918)  $6.803,151,915
035  Chile
030 Disbursements  - Commercial Banks  922.499.968  701,400,000  325.500,000  3.000.000  100,000
038 Principal Repayments- Commercial  Banks  37,900,000  70.700,000  21.400,000  17,500,000  158,000,000
046 Interest Payments -Commercial Banks  787,00,0G03  826.099,968  985.200,000  846.200,000  514,900.032
Undiscounted Accumulated Flow  97,599.968  (195,399,968)  (681,100.000)  (860.700.000)  (672,800.032)  5
Discounted Accumulated Flow  32,479.976  (59.341,596)  (192,450,018)  (229,474,780)  (169,512.374)  S664,559.884
038  Colombia
030 Disbursements- Coommercial  Banks  556,099.968  383.500,000  1,220,499,968  130.300,000  1.,90.199.936
038 Principal Repayments - Commercial Banks  183.900,000  258,900,000  374,400,000  532.700.000  823,299,968
046 Interest Payments- Commercial Banks  282,000.000  359,000,000  320,400,000  370.500.000  399.000.000
Undiscounted Accumulated Flow  90,199,968  (234,400.000)  525,699,968  (772,900,000)  (132,100,032)  8
Discounted Accumulated Flow  30,017,354  (71.185.631)  148,540,549  (206.066.060)  (33,282,683)  $769,493,181
Source:  World Bank, World Debt Tables:  1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976
040 Congo.  Poopbs Republic  of the
030 Disbure.,emils  - Commwrca Banks  0  0  6.100.000  12,700,000  900.000  8,900,000  7.100.000
038 Principal  Repaimwers*  Commeci  Banks  o  0  700,000  1,500,000  2.600.000  3,200,000  1.300,000
046 Inerest Payments  - Coumne  Barnk  0  0  0  0  400,000  500,000  300,000
Unicoounied Accumulated  Flow  0  0  5,400,000  11,200,000  (21:00,000)  5,200,000  5,500,WO
Disounted Accumulated  Flow  0  0  4,556,806  9.081,447  (1,590,780)  3.651,146  3,648,774
041 CostsRica
030 Disbursements  -Comrnrncal Banks  6,400,000  24.100,000  23,800.000  43,700,00o  49,200,000  72,700,000  59,6e0,000
OJO  Principal  Repayment-  Cornmercial  Banks  11,800,000  12,500.000  14,800,000  18,600,000  18,900,000  24.800.000  21,300,000
046 Irnerest  Paynments  - Comnnca  Banks  1.900,000  2.300,000  2.400.000  3,700,000  7,900.000  11,500,000  11,100,00
Undiscounted  AccumulWaed  Flow  (7.300,000)  9,300,000  6,600.000  21t400,000  22,400,000  36,400,000  27,200.000
Discounted  Accumuated Flow  (6,843.087)  8.189,056  5.569,429  17,352.051  16.968  Y  25,558,022  18.044.844
085 Cote d'lvoire
030 Disbursenmerts  -Comrcial  Banks  7,200.000  40.400,000  17,100,000  107.900,000  45,700.000  139.200,000  139.900.000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  2,000,000  6.400,000  8.000,000  13,100,000  36.200.000  23.300,000  45,500.000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial Banks  2,800,000  4,100.000  4.800.000  .O,300,0 3  17,900,000  25.900,000  30.300.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  2.400.000  29,900,000  4,300,000  84.500.000  (8.400.000)  90.000,000  64,100,000
Dzscounted  Accumulaed Flow  2.249,782  26.328,256  3,628,568  66,S16,277  (6,363,122)  63,192,911  42,524,798
048 Ecuador
030 Disbursements  -CommerciW  Banks  2.200,000  3,200,000  55.800.000  16,200,001  35,500,000  89.900.000  115.700,000
038 Principal  Repayments  -Commercial Banks  2.500,000  3.800.000  4.600.000  5,200,000  45,500,000  7.400G000  24,300,000
046 Interest  Payments  - CommercW Banks  500,000  900,000  2.500,000  4,800.000  4.400,000  5.800,000  10,700,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (800,000)  (1.500.000)  48,700.000  6,200,001  (14,400,000)  76.700,000  80.700,000
Oiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (749,927)  (1.320.816)  41.095,639  5,027,231  (10,908,209)  53.854,403  53,537.460
065 Greece
030 Disbursements-  Commercial Banks  48,600,000  72,000,000  300.400,000  160,600,000  540,900.032  506.500,000  91,000,000
038 Principal  Repayments  . Commercial Banks  8,900,000  10.200,000  26,100,000  62,900,000  53,300,000  117,600,000  138.100,000
046 rnterest  Payments- Commercial  Banks  11.100,000  15,500,000  22,500,000  42,500.000  89,500,000  114,000,000  114,900,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  28,600,000  46.300,000  251.800,000  55,200,000  398,100,032  274.900,000  (162.000.000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  26,809,903  40.769.172  212,482,173  44,758,562  301,566,543  193,019,237  (107.472.968)
074 Honduras
030 Disbursements  - Commercial  Banks  0  0  3,000,000  0  3.600.000  1.700,000  17.300,000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  0  0  0  300,000  600,000  900,.0C  1,600,000
046 Interest  Pments  - Commerci  Banks  0  0  0  100,000  300,000  500,000  1,000,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  0  0  3.000,000  (400.000)  2,700.000  300,000  14.700,000
Discounted  Accumutated  Flow  0  0  2,531.559  (324.337)  2,045,289  210,643  9.752,177
Source: World Bank,  Word Oebt  Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1977  197?  1979  1980  199'  1982  1983
040 Congo,  People's  Republic  of the
030 Disburseeents  -Commercial Banks  8.600,000  72.100,000  76.600.000  477,300,000  171,500.000  238.200,000  234.30G,OO0
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commea  Banks  Z500,000  2,600,000  2.800,000  S.600,000  15.800,000  48,900.000  127,900,000
046 hterest Pamwnt  -Comrcal  Banks  400.000  800,000  8,300,000  12,200,000  59.300,000  67.300,000  73,400,000
Undiscounted  Accumulatd  Fw  5,700,000  68,700,000  65.500,000  458,500.000  96.400.000  12ZO0,000  33,ODQ.000
DLtcourted  Accumulated  Flow  3,601,764  41,239,479  36.670,589  233,271,345  43.984,621  48.816,690  11,929,706
041 Costa Rica
030 DisbursemenXt  - Commercial  Banks  133,000,000  125,500.000  267,500,000  123.900,MO  121,100.000  14.700,000  10.700.000
038 PrincipaJ  Raymwents  - Comfnircial Banks  30.600,000  148,000,000  136,600,000  42.000,000  39,400,000  11,800.000  30,800.000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercil  Banks  14,600,000  32200.000  36,900,000  78,200.000  60.000.000  21,900,000  345,000,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  87,800,000  (54.700.000)  94.000,000  3.700,000  21.700.000  (19.000,000)  (365.100.000)
Discounted  Accurnt-dted  flow  55,479,808  (32,835,510)  52,626,494  1,882,451  9.901,102  (7,602.599)  (131,985,931)
089 Coted'lWolre
030 Disburseamets  -Commercial Banks  526,800,000  681.800,000  711.500,032  989,.70,032  893,099,968  946,400,000  259.600,000
038 Principal Repaymfients.  Commercial  Banks  44,800.000  92.800,000  179,500.000  358.000.000  338.000.000  332,800,000  245,000.000
046 interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  56,300.000  105,000.000  151.700,000  246  400,000  298.800.000  360.000,000  298.300.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  425.700,000  484.000.000  380,300.032  385,300,032  256,299,968  253,600,000  (283.700.000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  268,994.921  290.537,234  212,913,375  196,029.350  116.942,499  101.474,694  (102.559.323)
048 Ecuador
030 Disbursements-  Commercial  Banks  426,900.000  367,600.000  890,600,000  505.600,000  538.000,000.  40.700,000  26.300,000
038 Principal Repaymrents  - Commercial  Banks  35,700.000  64.90,o000  510,200,000  109.900.o,0  102.300,0Q0  179,100,000  8,000,00U
046 Interest Payments- Commercial  Banks  25,100.000  63.200.000  117.500,000  184,400,000  277.100,000  364,300,0oo  253,500,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  366.100.000  239.50Q.000  262,900,000  211,300,000  158.600,000  (502,700,000)  (235,200.000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  231.334,369  143.767,908  147,186,226  107,503,239  72.364,739  (201,148,773)  (65.026,270)
065 Greece
030 Disbursements  - Commercial  Banks  316,600,000  529.400,032  421.500,000  1.190.00,Q000  1.129,800,064  921,800.000  1.382,899.968
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  206,900.000  163.800.000  208,500.000  254.500,000  323.500,000  305.600.000  297.200,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  93,300,000  131,899.992  205,800,000  304,900.000  569,900.032  440,300,000  520,400,032
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  16,400.000  233,700.040  7.200.000  630,600,000  236.400.032  175.900,000  565,299,936
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  10,362,971  140.286.288  4.030.965  320.830,775  107.862.715  70.384,064  204.359.459
074 Honduras
030 Disbursernents  -Commercial  Banks  40,100.000  36.900.000  104,800.000  52,800,000  78,200.000  Z0,200,00D  39.800.000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Cornrmercial  Banks  3.700,000  7,700,000  33,099,998  13,400,C30  11,800,000  8,500,000  5.500,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  3,300.000  5.600.000  12,800.000  25.800.000  33.200.000  46,000,000  28.400,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  33,100.000  23.600,000  58,900,002  13.600.000  33,200.000  (24.300,000)  5,900.000
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  20.915.508  14.166,692  32.975.538  6,919,281  15,148,230  (9.723.324)  2.132.887
Source: World Bank World Debt  Tabe:  1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1984  1985  1986  1967  1988
040  Congo, Peopbe's Republic  of the
030 ODsbursent  - Conimcial  Banks  200,804000  310.500,000  453.200,000  366.400.000  145.60,000
038 Pric%a  Repaymet  -Caommrci  Banks  144,800,000  14U,700,000  183.600,000  75.700.000  109,300.000
046  terest Paymets  -Commec  Banks  61,300.000  63,100,000  57.800.000  1Z300,000  30.200.000
Undiscounted  A  muated Flow  (5,300.000)  103,700,000  211.800,000  278.400,000  6,100,000  4
Disounted Accumulatd  Flow  (1,763,70)  31.49Z961  59,845,711  74,225.373  1,536,899  $604,198,761
041  CGotaRica
030 Disbursements -Commcimd  lanks  1.000,000  88,100,000  600,000  0  Z300.000
038 Prmicpal  Repayments -Commrci  Bas  30,500.000  25.000.000  3.700,000  1,500.000  9,400.000
046 Intest  Payment  -Commeca  Banks  119,000.000  211,600,000  81,300,000  36,900.000  53,300,000
Unoiscounded  Accumulated  Flow  (148,500,000)  (148.500,000)  (84.400.000)  (38,400,000)  (60.400,000)  4
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (49,418.833)  (45.098,405)  (23.847,866  (10,237.983  (15,217.816)  ($111,516,448)
085  Coted  voire
030 Disbwserrt  -ComnerciW Banks  143.300,000  136.500,000  86,000.000  18,100.000  64,500,000
038 Prindpal Repayments -Commercial  Banks  86.300,000  76.300,000  123,10C.000  52.500.000  51.200.000
048 Interest Payments -Comrmerial Banks  307.400.000  290.500,000  317,600.000  193,600.000  31,300,000
Uncdscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (250.400.000)  (230.300,000)  (354,700.000)  (228,000,000)  (18.900,000)  3
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (83.329,803)  (69.940,490)  (100.223.200)  (60,788.021)  (4,535,111)  S965.593.596
048 Ecuador
030 Disbursements -Comn scial Banks  446.200,000  235.300,000  336,800.000  42,800.000  58,000,000
038 Principal  Repaymer.s -Commercial Banks  69,200.000  97,100,000  8,200.000  17,900,Pn  17,400,000
046 Interest Payments -Commercial Banks  662,600,000  542.099,968  458.300.000  113,800.000  63,100,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (285,600.000)  (403.899.968)  (129,700,000)  (88.900,000)  (2Z500.000)  4
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (95.043.896)  (122,661,579)  (36,647.728)  (23.701,996)  (5,668,889)  $272t793,132
065 Greece
030 Disbursements -Commercial Banks  1.416,999.936  2,075,300,096  1.103,300,096  1.273,699,968  1.463.200,000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial Banks  374,900,000  489.200,000  660,700.032  1,739.300,096  1,377,800.064
046 Interest Payments -Commercial Banks  515,000,000  686,400,000  677,800,000  694,499,968  775.500,032
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  527,099,936  899,700,096  (235,199,936)  (1.160.100,096)  (690.100,096)  3
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  175,411.876  273,232590  (66,457,542)  (303,299,076)  (173.871,136)  $1,469,066.572
074 Honduras
030 Disbursements  - Commercial Banks  13,800,000  44,200,000  11,800,000  2400,000  7,800,000
038 Pricipal  Repayments- Commercial Banks  6,400,000  7  .30.000  8,500,000  46,800,000  10,400,000
046 Interest Payments  Commercial Banks  22,400,000  Z ,.400,000  15,000,000  10.000,000  8,500.000
Urdiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (15,000.000)  11.200,000  (11,700,000)  (54.400,000)  (11,100.000)  7
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (4,931,801)  3,401,361  (3,305,925)  (14.503.809)  (2796,652)  $74.553,317
Source: World  Bank,  World Debt Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976
078 India
030 Dibusimene  - Conmercal  Banks  15.00,000  23.000,090  7.800.000  1,700,000  14.300,000  10.200.000  9.400.000
038 Principal  Fepment s  Commci  Banks  9.600,000  14,600,000  18,300.00  20200,000  18,100,000  8,100,001  1.000.00
046 bItred  Payment - Commewia Banks  Z900,000  6.300,000  60100,000  4,900,000  Z400,000  1,900,000  2000000
b  _dsoued  AcuuAted  Fkaw  3.300,000  Z100.000  (16,600.000)  (23.400,000  (6.200.000)  200.000  (4.600.000)
Disourald  Accumuated  Flow  3.093,450  1.849,142  (14,007.959)  (18.973,738)  (4.696.50  140,428  (3.051.702)
$79 Indonesia
030  D  _  *ursenent  . Conm  rcia  Banks  300,000  0  134,300,000  212700,000  224.600,000  1,177,500,032  434.800OD0
038 Puip  RepaymentB  -Commerci  Banks  500.000  200,000  200,000  15,10.000  28,400,000  83.000,000  116.900.000
046 Intre  Payment - Commca  Banks  0  0  0  5,700.000  13.000,000  56,600.000  155.500,000
Undiscourd  Accrmialed  Flow  (200.000)  (200.000)  134,100,000  191.900,000  18520.000  1.037,900.032  ISZ400.000
Obcounled Accmutaa  Flow  (187,482  (176.109)  113.160.681  1t5,600.870  140,291.684  728.754,718  107.738.334
080 Junala
030 Olbuuemewt  - Conmetrcia Banks  1.000,000  9.600,000  31,400.000  10Z500.000  185,30.3000  156,700.000  30.600,000
038 Pncipal  Repaymnts- Comnmercial  Banks  Z400,000  260e,000  11.500.000  6,200.000  2z.z0,0oW  17,20,000  35.600.000
046 Intrest  Payment - Comercial  banks  1,200000  1.300.000  3.50,000  6.600,000  19.600,000  33.300.000  37.400.000
Undiscounted  Accunulated Flow  (2600.000)  5.700,000  16.400,000  89.700.000  123.700,000  106.200.000  (4Z400.000)
Dicounted Accunubted  Flow  (2.437.264)  5.019.099  1,839.,188  72.732,663  93.704.5Q4  74.567.635  (28.128.728)
109 Mexio
030  0e  - Commercial Banks  431.600,000  479.600,000  584,000.000  1,689,100.032  2.379.800.064  3.111.100.160  4,561,500.160
038 Pcpal  Repayments  -Comercial  B  265.900,000  256,000.000  312300.000  483,400.000  296,700.000  431.400.000  824.000.000
046 Inerest Pament  - Coammci  Banks  105.700,000  104.300.000  118.200.000  187.600,000  384.500.000  610.499.968  803.700.032
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Fow  60.000,000  119,100,000  153.50.000  1.018.100,032  1,698.600.064  O069.200192  2.933s.806128
Discounted  Accunwiated  Flow  t6,244.551  104,872.752  123.531.428  825.519,606  1,286,714.164  1,452875.380  1.94.322275
111  Mrocco
030 O  _bunsent  - Commerial  Banks  0  0  0  0  0  140.000.000  376,300,000
038 Fnpal  RePAments.-  Commcial  Bans  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
046 hIwest Payments  - Counercila  Banks  0  0  0  0  0  6200,000
Unriscounted  Accumud  Fbw  0  0  0  0  0  140,000.000  370,100.000
Discounted  Acclulted  Flow  0  0  0  0  0  98.300,084  245.529.294
120 Ncaagua
030 Disbureents  - Commercia Banks  11,600.000  29.50.000  52.600.000  108.800,000  93.400,000  107.300,000  19.80,000
038 Principal  Pepayments  -Co  a  Banks  10,50,.000  17.00,000  14.200.000  42700,000  1.800,000  10.800,OD0  25.300,000
046 Interest  Payment - Commoerca  Banks  3,200.000  3.600,000  5,800,000  11,200.000  20,300,000  26,200,000  30.000000
Undiscounted  ccumulated  Flow  (2100.000)  8.400.000  32.600,000  t,900,000  61.300.000  70,300.000  (35.50o.000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (1,968.559)  7,396.567  27,509,606  44.515,309  46,U35.638  49,360,685  (23.551.175)
Source: World Bank World Debt Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDtTORS
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
078 India
030 D  kmn  * Commercial  Banks  94.500.000  46.200,000  62,400,000  330,200,000  197,000.000  217,500.000  50t600,000
038 Principa Repayments  - Commercil  am  4.200,000  23,300,000  29,000,000  33,900,000  42,100,000  64.194°-S  153.700,000
048 Iterest  Payment - Comrmerciaw  Banks  1.700,000  13,300,000  17,700.000  113,300,000  156,100.000  203.4L ,.  322.900.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  88,600,010  9,600,000  15,700.000  183,000,000  (1,200,000)  (50.099.996)  26.000,000
Discounted  Acculated  Flow  55,965,318  5,762722  8.789.744  93,105.030  (547,526)  (20.046,852)  9,399.162
079  hIonesia
030 Disbursemeft  s  Commrrcl  Banks  154,800.000  652.800.000  594.400,000  1.013.000.000  778.299.968  1.036.600,000  1,536,300.032
038 Pricipal  Repay-ionts  Commrci  Banks  336,100.000  979,400,000  418.100.000  189,800.000  279.600,000  246,700,000  283.400.000
046 interest  Payments  -ComrrcW  Banks  162,800.000  131,399,992  198.000.000  268.000.000  389.600,000  474,600,000  451,000,000
Unrscounted Accumuaed Flow  (414,100.000)  (457.999.992)  (21.700.000)  555.200,000  109.099.968  315.100,000  801.900.032
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (261,665.015)  (274.929.857)  (12.148.882)  282.469.468  49.779,260  126,083,108  289.891.872
086 Jamaia
030 Disbursements  - Commer  l Banks  63.400.000  85.900,C0,  8,700.LOO  3.700,000  64.300,004  53,400,000  500,000
038 Prncipal Repayments  -Commercial  Banks  68,800.000  78.000.000  34,80j,400  15,600.000  59.900,000  25,900,000  48.800.000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  29.500,000  333,00.000  45,600.000  54,500.000  39,400.000  61,500.000  72.901,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (34.900.000)  (23.800W.00)  (71,700.000)  (66.400.000)  (34.999.998)  (34,000.000)  (121,200,000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (22.05Z908)  j14.286,748)  - 41,698)  (33.782,371)  (15,969,518)  (13,604.651)  (43,814,557)
109  Mexico
030 Disbursements  - Comnmercial  Banks  4 987.399.680  7,234.999,808  9.465,099,264  7.625,100.288  10,063,099.904  . 8,085.299.712  5.282.700,288
038 Principal  Repaynts  -Commercial Banks  1.870.300,032  3.961.499,904  6,280,500.224  3.444.899.840  3,085,199,812  2063.500.032  2.631.500.032
046 Interest  Payments.  Comnmercial  Banks  960.700,032  1.383,300.096  2,297.199.872  3,260,100,096  4,136,999.936  5.191,899,648  4,933,000,192
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  2.,i.399,616  1.890.199.808  887,399,168  920,100,352  2,840,900,096  829.900.032  (2.281.799.938)
Discounted  Accumuted  Flow  1.362,604.053  1,134,655,834  496,816,029  468,120,059  1,296,223.165  332.073.548  (824,884.935)
I11  Morocco
030 Disbursements  - Commercial  Banks  770.000,000  519,300,000  781,600.000  482,100,000  156,600,000  604,900,032  83,000.000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  3,600,000  147.300,000  192.200,000  294,800,000  317.000,000  367.300,000  242.000,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  57.700,000  119,000.000  212,900.000  371,300.000  434,800,000  337.800.000  315,500,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  708.700,000  253,000.000  376,500.000  (184,000.000)  (595.200,000)  (100,199,968)  (474,500,000)
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  447,819,358  151,871,736  210,785,903  (93,613.801)  (271.573,094)  (40,093.695)  (171.534,715)
120 Nicara,ua
030 Disbursements  - Comrrercial Banks  95,200,000  38,100,000  0  0  0  1,800,000  1.700,000
038 Principal  Repaym_nts  - Commercial  Banks  33,400,002  34,200,000  2,600,000  20,?00,000  10,200,000  14,300,000  1,100.000
046 Intetest  Payments  - Commercial  anks  34.900,000  30,300,000  19,200,000  100,000  45,100.000  70,300,000  500,000
Undiscounled  Accumulated  Flow  26,693,998  (26.400,000)  (21.800.000)  (20.300.000)  (55,300,000)  (82,800.000)  100.000
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  16.997,799  (15,847,485)  (12,204,868;  (10,328,044)  (25,231,842)  (33.131,328)  30,151
Source: Wodd Bank,  Wortd  Debt  Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRNATE  CREDITORS
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
078  hidia
030 Disbursemets.  Commercial  Banks  623,40D.000  767.400,000  1,74Z400.000  1.449,699,968  1.672.899,968
038 Principal  Repayment -Commercial  Eanks  178,00.,000  202.500,W0  422,000.000  383,500,000  430,900.000
046 Intrest  Payments  -Commercial  Banks  396,200,000  493,700,000  709,600.000  921,700,032  1.240.499.968
Undiscounted  Accumulaed Flow  49,200,000  71,200,000  610.800,0O  144,499,936  15C9,000  5 Discounted  Accumutated  Flow  16,373,108  21,622.939  172,586  215  38,525.724  377.926  $366.286,542
079 Indone6si
030 Disbursentnts - Commercia Banks  658.80,000  796,200,000  1,037.699,5t  755.800,000  1.360.099.968
038 Prnipal  Repay_mnt - Commercial  Banks  482,100,000  994,800,000  423,900,000  777,0000000  1.820.000.000
046 Interest  Payments  - CommrerrlW  Banks  569,900,032  440,400,000  457.300,W  .W08,200,000  518,7W.000
Undiscoumed  Accumubated  Flow  (393.209.032)  (639.000,000)  156,499,968  (529.400.000)  (978.600,032)  6
Discounted  Accunulated Flow  (130.851.761)  (194.059,805)  44,220,264  (141.145.520)  (246.558,868)  $776,266,959
086 Jamaica
030 Disbursement -Commercial  Banks  21,100.000  11.200,000  0  0  0
038 Princpal RBepaynents  - Commercie Banks  500.000  5.000.000  9.500.000  10.3W,000  9,000,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  74.900,000  68,300,000  50,800.000  47,800,000  37.500.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (54.300.000)  (62.100.000)  (60.300.000)  (58,100,000)  (46.500.090)  2 Discot- ed Accumulated  Fko.  (18,070.321)  (18,859.333)  (17,038.226)  ;15,490.281)  (11,715.7(i3)  ($35,529,179)
109 Mexico
1130  Disbursements  - Comnercial Banks  3,148,800,000  1.883,000,064  449,600,000  4,903,499,7-7  2,166,000,128
038 Principal  Repaymen:s  - Commercial  Banks  1,936,699,904  S89.200,000  709,000,000  684.700,032  544,800,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  5.71Z999,936  6,034.399,744  4.656,700,416  4.714.399./44  4,599,00n,064
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (4,500,899.840)  (5.040.599,680)  (4.916,100,416)  (495.600,000)  (2.977,799,936)  1 Discounted  Accumuiated  Flow  (1.497.8398.38)  (1.530,794,666)  (1,389,081.797)  (112.133,962)  (750.258.490)  $4,767,579,356
111 Mworocco
030 Disbursemnts - Comaercial Banks  95,000,000  0  10.000,000  61,900.000  0
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  2,100,000  4,000.000  7.600.000  0  13.400,000
046 Intrest  Payments  -Commercial  Banks  273,200.000  188.200,000  157,900,000  253,300,000  243.200.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (180,300,000)  (192.200.000)  (155,500.000)  (191,400,000)  (256.600.000)  1 Discounted  Accumuaed Flow  (60,001,451)  (58.369.788)  (43,937.715)  (51.029,944)  (64.650.525)  S293,50o.648
120 Nicaragua
030 Disbursements  - Commercial  Banks  1,EW0.00  0  1,600,000  4.300.000  0
038 Principal  Repayment -Commercial  P inks  700.000  100,000  100,000  0  0
046  Interest  Payments- Commercial  Banks  11,1004000  10,400,000  100,000  0  0
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (10,200.000)  (10.500.000)  1.400.000  4,300,000  0  7 D0 )ounred Accumulaed  Flow  (3,394,425)  (3.188,776)  395,581  1,146,441  0  $64,947,274
Source: World Bank WorMl  Debt  Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRiVATE  CREDITORS
19SS  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976
125 Psksn
030  bburanw,s  -CommercIalag*  0  0  0  0  0  °  a
038  F  IPclpaRspmenta-Commedn  Bans  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
046 Ir_  FPymw.  -Coa,nweWBen  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Unfsone  cuwfdFo  0  0  0  a  a  a  a
Oisoowd  Aocmx  ed Flow  a  0  0  0  0  0  0
128 Paraguay
030 Dis3m  s - Conwmwcid  Banks  1.900,000  0  4.000.000  5.5S0,00  9,500,000  90  3.5,S00,OD
D38  Pftm*e  Repaymet  - Caomurcid Ban  300.00D  300,000  700.000  1.700,000  Z400,000  4.800,000  Z400,O00
046 k0oresa  Paymnt s  Comneca  Banks  0  200.000  300.000  50o.000  900,000  1,800,000  1,800.00D
Undhscouagd  Accufu_iamL  Flow  1,600.000  (50.000  3.000,000  3,300,000  6.20.000  6,300,000  (70000)
ODtunled  Accumulaaed  Fbo  1,429.9,  (440.272)  2.531,559  Z675.784  4.696,590  4,423,504  (464,3"
129 Pew
O30D  iObursements  CommWrcia  Banks  3.000000  2.900.000  119,500.000  369.300.000  612,600.000  377.90,000  357.100.000
038 Pincipal Reum/tu  - CammeciW Banks  25.000.000  24.700.000  27.200,000  148,200.000  134.500,000  31.400.000  50,100,000
046 knares  Payment  - Comwmcial Ban  11.700,000  1Z600,000  10,200,000  26,800,000  56,400.000  114,600.00D  111,800,000
Unciscou_td Accuntatod  Fbw  (33.700,000)  (34,400-m0  82.100.000  194,300,000  421,700.000  231,900,000  195.200.000
Disco  AccumAted  Fbw  (31,590.690)  (30,290.703)  69,280,327  157.546.894  319,443,861  162827,068  129.498293
13D FtNippne
030 Dbsaments  - C  cal  Banks  49.900.000  9.900,000  50.80,.000  14,000,000  136.700.000  . 190.900.000  161,100.000
038 Pncl  fpaymnts  . Co  rcia  Banks  39.200.00D  18,400,000  34,800.000  69200,000  6B.200.000  82.400.000  51,800,000
046 Iere_t  Paymnts . Commci  Banks  10.900.000  20.200.000  15,600.000  6,600,000  15.000,000  29,300,000  33,000,000
Unlscounted Accwmiu  d Flow  (200,000)  (2.700,000)  400.000  (61.800.000)  53.500,000  79.200,00D  76.300.0OD
DisteAccumuated  Fow  (187.482)  (25,271.604)  337,541  (50,110.129)  40,527,025  55,609,762  50,618,441
141 Senegal
030 Disbxerents  - Conmmrca Banks  0  0  0  35.900,000  t0,6,000  2300000  21,200,00
038  rcpal  Repayment- Comnercia  Baks  a  0  0  0  1,000,000  Z600.000  4,900,000
0  k6I'et  Paymernts CommStci  qwnk  0  0  0  300,000  4,400,000  7,900.000  6,700,000
Undscounted  Acculated  flow  0  0  0  35,600,000  5,200,000  1z500.000  9,600,000
Disc  Accumulaed  Flow  0  0  0  28.866,029  3,939,075  8,776,793  6,368,768
167 Tutkey
030 DisburseOm_ -Commercial Banks  0  29.700.000  0  1,600,000  0  1,800.000  107,000,000
038 Ptnal  RPaments.  Commercia Banks  1.100,000  3.900,000  3,400.000  8.800.000  3.500,000  4.200.000  ',400,000
046 Ierest  Pay  nb*  Cormercial  Banks  700,000  1,300.000  2,000,000  2,300,000  1,800.000  1,800,000  9.800.000
Undcscounted  Accunudaled  Flow  (1,800000)  24,500,000  (5.400,000)  (9,500,000)  (5.300,000)  (4,200,000)  91,800,000
Discoued  AccumLated Flow  (1,687,337)  21.573.320  (4.556.806)  (7,703,013)  (4,014,827)  (2,949.003)  60,901,349
Souce:  Wod  Bank World Debt  Tabes:  1969U990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITCRn:
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 125 Pastn
030 Disbur3sement  - Commercial  Bans  0  9.600,000  17,200.000  100,600,000  16.000,000  492.200,000  210,500,000
08  PrincIpal  Pepaymwnt -Comsmecial  Banks  0  0  2,500,000  9,700,000  16.800.000  20.600.000  384,100,000
0468  ltssl  Paymnts -Comenrcia  Banks  0  100.000  1,100,000  9,000.000  16.100.000  53.500,000  71,800,C00
Undiscouned AccumuLdaed  Flow  0  9.500.000  13,600.000  81,900.000  (16,900.000)  418,100.000  (245.400,000) Discounted  Acumultaed Flow  0  5,702'  694  7,614,046  41,668,317  (7,710,997)  167.297,199  (88.713,633)
128 Paguay
030 Oisbursernme  -Comnuj.j  Banks  8,600,000  33,400,002  38.700.000  33.300,000  49,300,000  126,800,000  64,100,000 038 Pnncipa RePayment - Commerc!al  Banks  2,500.000  5.200.000  8,000,000  17.100.000  6,300,000  6,600,000  6.100,000
046 ntet  Payments  - Comnmercl Banks  1,300,000  3,800,000  4.400,000  11,800,000  7,100,000  11,600,000  9,500,000
UndiscoL ted Accumnlated  Flow  4,600.000  24.400,002  26.300,000  4,400,000  35,900,000  108,600,000  48.500.000 Discounted  Accumuilated  Fow  3.033.065  14,646.920  14.724,221  2.238,591  16.380,165  43.454,857  17,S33.053
129 Paru
030 Oiburseuents  - Commercial  Banks  294.900.000  34.300,000  454,400.000  248,400.000  633.800,000  1.062.000,000  732299,968 038  Pnncipal Repayments  . Commer'.ial  Banks  164.J00.000  138.100,000  196,200,000  444,800.000  764.800,000  375.300,000  41.2O,000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial  tbanks  132.899.,92  157,900,000  202,300,000  273,900,000  253.500,000  273.400,000  213.900,000
Undiscountred  Accrumulated  Flkw  (2.699.992)  (261,700.000)  55,900,000  (470,300,000)  (384,500.000)  413.300,00G  477.199.968 Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (1.706.094)  (157.094.203)  31,295,968  (239,274,839)  (175,436,584)  165.3;6,542  172,510.770
130 Philippines
030 Disbursenents  - Coimercial  Banks  310,600,000  606.099,968  630.400,000  6628W0000  552.000,000  . 1,062,499,968  762.600.000 038 Principal  Repayments  . Commeicial  Banks  38.000.000  305.300.000  201.600,000  43.500,000  107.900,000  181.700.000  236,300.000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  28.500.000  36.500.000  79.400.000  167.700,000  260.200.016  227.800.000  298,600.000
Undiscounted  Accumuated Flow  244,100.000  264.299,968  549,400.000  451.600,000  183.899,984  652,999.968  227,700,000 Oiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  154,243,975  158,654.921  307.585.060  229,760,828  83,908.413  261,289.322  82,314,973
141 Senegal
030 Disbursetmnts.  - Commercial  Banks  16,299.999  68.700,000  44.400,000  42,600,000  1,300,000  4,t00.000  700,000 038 Principal  Reparments  - Com.ercial  Banks  12.500.000  29,500.000  29.200,000  53,000,000  13,000,000  0  0 046 nterest  Payments  - Commercia Banks  8,500,000  11,900,000  17.000.000  20,000.000  17,000.000  8.400,000  4.100,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (4.700.001)  27,300,000  (1.800,000)  (30,400,000)  (28,700.000)  (4,300.000)  (3,400.000) Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (2.969.876)  16.387.741  (1.007,741)  (15.466.628)  (13.095.006)  (1,720.588)  (1,229,121)
167 Turkey
030 Oisbursements  -Commerctal  Banks  384.600.000  305.700,000  3.028.300,032  600,200,000  163,700.000  481.700.000  354.400,000
038 Principal  Repayments-  Commercial  BanLc  7.100.000  61,300.000  114.000,000  154.300.000  183,600.000  160.800,000  293.000,000
046 inlerest Payments  - Commercial  Banks  31,700,000  33,300,000  96,100,000  250,200.000  542.700.032  601,700,032  510.000,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  345,80.000  211,100,000  2.818.200,032  195.700.000  (562600,032?  (280.800.032)  (448.600.000) Oiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  218,507.033  126,719.856  1,577,787,089  99,566.417  (256,698,641)  (112.358.428)  (162,171,703)
Source: World Bank,  Wold Debt  Tabes:  1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1984  1985  1986  1987  19b8
125 Pakistan
030 Nsbursemnfta-  Commercial  Banks  326,700,000  113,900,000  78.800.000  300,000,000  33,300,000
038 Principal  Repayfmns - Commercud  Baks  165.000,000  266.200,016  38.500.000  126,400,000  178.000.000
0O  nt4er  Payment  Commercial Banks  59.700.000  43.200,000  28,200.000  29.400,000  44.300,000
Undisoounted  Accum  tlded  Flow  102.000.000  (195,5w0,016)  12.100,000  144,200.000  (189.000.00)  7
Disouned  Accumulald  Flow  33.944.249  (59.371.980)  3,418,948  38A.45.757  (47.618.664)  S94,675,935
128 Pwaguay
030 0Dsbursent  s  Commeria  Banks  53.600,000  41,500.000  64.500,000  22,f.,0,000  6,600,000
038 Principi  Repaymnt  -Conmmcial Banks  16.900.000  22.200.000  35.300.000  27.000.000  36,500.000
0468  Inreat'  ayment -Commercia Banks  17,800,000  27,900.000  20200,000  11.300,000  19.300,000
Unciscounted  AccumulAted  Fow  18U900,000  (8.600.o00)  9,ooe000  (15.700.00)  (49,200.000)  7
Discouted  Accumutated  Flow  6.289,670  (2,611.760)  2,543,019  (4.185,842)  (12,395,70)  $116,572,615
129 Peru
030 DisburseM*nts-  Commeci  Banks  652,400,000  102.800,000  47,800.000  7,300000  0
038 Prncipal Repayments-  Commerca Banks  60.100,000  58.700.000  32.200.0,  3,200000  C
046 Ieest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  213,400,000  141.400.000  32.099,998  1,600,000  o
Undiscounted  Accumulated  FlYw  378,900.000  (97.300.000  (16.499,998)  2,500,000  0  7
&4countad Accumulatd  Flow  126,092,900  (29,549,326)  (4.662,201)  666,535  0  S664,934.522
130 Phdikppines
030 Dsbursements  -Commercial Banks  206.500.000  405,000,000  528,504,000  7,700.000  6.000.000
038 Principal  Repayments  -Commercial Banks  17.60.000  11,10,.000  189.300.000  629,500,032  621.200,000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial  Banks  363.300,000  379,500.000  413.100.000  668,400,000  859,200,000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (174.400.000)  14,400,000  (73,900.000)  (1,290.200.032)  (1,472.400.000)  6
Discouned Accumulated  Flow  (58.038,010)  4.373,179  (20.881,011)  (343.985.557)  (370.972,068)  S559,77,s581
141 Senegal
030 £isbumemer  - Commercial  Banks  200,000  900,000  34,600,000  2.500,000  0
038 Principal  repayments - Commercial  Banks  7.300.000  4,900,000  14,600,000  25.900,000  29,000.000
046 Interest  Payments  -Commercial Banks  12,100,000  13.100.000  7.300,0o0  9,900.000  9,900,Q00
Undiscounled  Accumulated  Flow  (19,200,000)  (17.110,000)  12.700,000  (33.300.000)  (38,900,000)  5
Discounted  Accumulted  Flow  16,389,506)  (5.193,150)  3,588.482  (8,878,250)  (9,800,878)  S2.176,143
167 Turkey
030 Disbursemen's  - Commercial  Banks  590,400,000  1,021.800,000  1,516,899,968  1,958,499,968  2.527,200,000
038 Principal  Repayments  - Commercial  Banks  354,500,000  937.299,968  835,600,000  1,167,699.968  1,582,199,936
046 leest  Paynmrts  -Conmercial Banks  480.700,000  515.900.032  568.900,032  702.499.968  1,078,499,968
UndLAcouted  Accumulated  Flow  (244,800,000)  (431.400.000)  112,399,936  88,300,032  (133,499,904)  6
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (81.466,197)  (131.013,145)  31.759,462  23.542.o0s  (33,635,381)  $1,362,02,080
Soure:  Wodd Bnk, Word Doe Tabes:  1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PRIVATE  CREDITORS
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976
173 Uruguay
030 Dslursemenits  - CoBmmeial  Banks  9,700,000  7,300,000  48,90000  5000  59,600.0O0  121,300.000  117,200,000
038 Prnipal  Repmets  - Cmmercial  Banks  21,000,0w0  7  5rMn*i0.  54,100,000  31.700.000  17.100,000  127,900,000  73,900.000
046  hntee Payment  Comzr.cr  Banks  7.100,000  5.600.000  5.90,0000  3.100,000  4,600,00  6.90o.000  10.200.000
Undscourled Accumulated  Flow  (18.400,000)  (5.800.000)  (11,100.000)  (29,8W,000)  37.900,000  (13,50000)  33,100,000
Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (17,248.329)  (5.107.153)  (9.366.768)  (24,163,137)  28,709,799  (9,478,937)  21.958.983
175 Vanezeta
030 Dsbursement - Commercil  Bank  139,71*2.000  207.500.000  254,700,000  104,400,000  87,200,000  0  1,000,000.000
038 Principal  Repaymes  - Commercial  Banks  5.600.000  39.5so.000  74.5,000  83,400,000  260,700,016  164.800.000  103,400.000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commcia  Banks  15,800,o0o  21.100.000  30.600.000  52,300,000  68,900,000  45,400,000  20,600.000
Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  118.300.000  146.900,000  149,600,000  (31,300.000)  (242,400,016)  (210.200,000)  876,000.000
Discounted  Accumulted Flow  110.895,507  129.351.868  126.240,402  (25,379,402)  (183,621,525)  (147,590,555)  581,150.125
181 Yugoslavia
030 Disbursements  -Commrcia  Banks  0  0  102,000,000  10,100.000  17,800.000  31,900,000  55,400.000
038 Principal  Repayments-  Commercial  Banks  50,000  600.000  700,000  1,300.000  2.300,000  26.700,000  20,500.000
046 Interest  Payments  - Commercial Banks  100,000  100,000  3,800.000  8,600,000  13.500.000  13,800,000  10.900,000
Undiscounted  Accumulaed  Fkw  (700,000)  (700,000)  97,500,000  200,000  2,000.000  (8,600,000)  24,000,000
Discounted  Accumulated  Flw  (656,186)  (616,381)  82,275,663  162,169  1,515.029  (6.038,434)  15,921,921
Source: World  Bank Word Debt  Tables:  19891990FLOWS  FROM  PRIATE CRE.TORS
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 173 Uruguay
030 Disbusements  - Co1mmercial  sani  144200,000  158,600,000  116.200,000  23e.200,000  263.299,984  347,100.000  439.900,000 038 Principal  Repayments  -Commeal  Banks  110.900,000  104,700,000  7,700.000  59200.000  21,700,000  37.700.000  31.700,000 046 kterest PayMents  - Commrci  Banks  7.700,000  10.800.000  18.700.000  49,600,000  66,199,996  100.000,000  152,300.000 Undiwounted  Accumulated  Flw  25.600.000  43.100.000  89,800,000  121.400.000  175.399,988  209.400.000  255,900000 Discounted  Accmulated Flow  16,176,345  25,872.221  50.275,097  61,764.758  80.030.103  83.788,647  92,509.449
175 Venezuela
030  Dments-  Cormewcia Banks  1,575,600.000  1.688.499,968  3.798.800.128  z366,500,096  2,047.800.064  1,971,900,032  2091,699,968 038 Principal  Repaymt  - Cmmercial  Banks  67.800.000  67.300,000  694.000.000  1,326,000,000  1,158.599,936  1.329.500.032  726.099,968 046 Interest  Paymerts  - CmeJ  Baks  119.400.000  276.200.000  460.700,000  1,052,800,064  1.051,199.936  1.470.499,968  1,601.800.064 UndGscourted  Accumulaled  Flow  1,388.400.000  1,344.999,968  2.644.100,128  (12,299,968)  (161,999.808)  82099,968)  (236.200,064) Oiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  877.313.951  807,381,344  1.480,316,158  (6.257,863)  (73.915.976)  (331.353,276)  (85.387,799)
181 Yugodsa
030 Disbsnets  - Commerci  Banks  36.100,000  20.300.000  15.Q00.000  685.600.000  372,100.000  61,900,000  651.200,000 038 Principal  Repayments  -Commercial Banks  21,700.000  28.200.0C0  31,800.000  38.800.000  55,600.000  46,700,000  30,200,000 046 Interest  Payments-Commecia Banks  11.900,000  18.100.000  19,000.000  17,200.000  162,400,000  175,100,000  122,700,000 UndlscojntedAccumulated  Flow  2,500,000  (26.000.000)  (35,800,000)  629.600.000  154.100.000  (159.900,000)  498,300.000 Discounted  Accumulated  Flo  1.579.721  (15.607.372)  (20,042,856)  320,322,004  70,311,515  (63.981,875)  180.138.564
Source: Would  Bank,  World Debt  Tables: 1989-1990FLOWS  FROM  PFIVATE  CREDfTOtS
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 173 Uruguay
030  Disbursements  -Cowmerdlal  Banks  53,300,000  35.900,000  11,400.000  56,500,000  0 038  Prinrxpal  Repaymnt  - Comecla  Ban*  28,100,000  37,200.000  7,600.000  7,400,000  69,100,000 046  Intlest Paymens  -Commercial  Banks  228,300,000  216,700,000  170,600.000  172,400,000  164,900.000
Undccouted Accumulaed  Flow  (203.100,000)  (218,000,000)  (166,800.000)  (123,300,000)  (234,000,000  4 Discounted  Accumulded  Flow  (67,588,989)  (66,25,067)  (47,130.617)  (32,73,522)  (58,956,44,  $122,966,443
175 Venezuela
030  Disbursnments  - Commercial  Banks  514,200,000  140,90n,000  73,400,000  294,000,000  391,400,000
038  Prncipal  Repayments  - Commercial  Bank  633,500,032  541,600,000  913,700,032  672,499,968  544,099,968 046  Interest  Payments  - Commercial  Banks  1,294,400,000  1,250,800,0Q  1,524,400,000  1,387,800,064  1,815,900,032 Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (1,413,700,032)  (1,651,500,.CO)  (2,364,700,032)  (1,766,300,032)  (1,968,600,000)  3 Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (470,460,642)  (501,548,.°33)  (668,164,092)  (470  920,544)  (495.989.958)  $652,058,789
181 YugosM0a
030 Disbursements  - Commercial  Banks  3,100,000  38,200,000  186,300,000  0  307,000,000 038  Principal  Repayments-  Commercia  Bank  1,100,000  21,500,000  912,700,032  276,800,000  112,200,000 046 Interest  Paymernts  -Commercial  Banks  341,600,000  433,800,000  487,400,000  452,900,000  474,900,000 Undiscounted  Accumulated  Flow  (339,600,000)  (417,100,000)  (1,213,800,032)  (729.700,000)  (280,100,000)  7 Discounted  Accumulated  Flow  (113,014,381)  (126,670,336)  (342,968,489)  (194,548,329)  (70,571,364)  ($282,489,417)
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